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OPTIMAL BANKRUPTCY IN A NON-
OPTIMAL WORLD
RICHARD M. HYNES *
Abstract: Consumer bankruptcy insures individuals against misfortune.
Like other forms of insurance, bankruptcy reduces an individual's
incentive to guard against misfortune and provides her with an
incentive to overstate her need for relief. The "first-best," or optimal,
bankruptcy system, like the first-best tax or public assistance system,
solves these moral hazards without any loss of efficiency. In bankruptcy,
this first-best approach would deny relief to debtors responsible for
their own distress and reduce the deserving debtors' obligations to an
amount commensurate with their ability to pay. While the Bankruptcy
Code tries (in part) to follow this first-best approach, such a utopian
system requires omniscient judges who can perfectly determine which
debtors deserve relief and how much a deserving debtor can pay. Real
bankruptcy judges have interpreted the Bankruptcy Code to implement
a second-best, or feasible, bankruptcy system that accounts for the
limited information that they possess.
INTRODUCTION
The truly destitute have little to fear from their creditors. Their
poverty prevents their creditors from seizing anything of value, and
the days when default meant imprisonment, enslavement, or even
death have long since passed.' Bankruptcy protects those with some-
thing left to lose—a home, a car, future income, etc. 2
 Without con-
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Massachusetts imprisoned defaulting debtors as late as 1857. CHARLES WARREN,
BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 52 (1935). Ancient Athens considered defaulting
on a debt a capital crime. E.g., Lawrence H. White, Bankruptcy as an Economic Intervention, 1
J. LIBERTARIAN &run. 281, 281 (1977). In ancient Rome the creditors of a defaulting
debtor could enslave the debtor or divide the debtor's body into proportionate shares. Id.
2
 See, e.g., Kathy Bergen, Bankruptcy Becoming Prosperity's Partner Largely a Declaration of
Mc Middle Class, Cm, Thin., July 5, 1998, at 6 (quoting Elizabeth Warren, "[bankrupt debt-
1
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sumer bankruptcy, creditors could reach these assets, 5 and debtors
would be worse off. Bankruptcy therefore provides debtors a
benefit—debt relief—which has economic value to the debtor only to
the extent that the debtor otherwise could have paid the debt. Be-
cause an ideal bankruptcy system would provide this benefit only after
the debtor has suffered some misfortune, bankruptcy can be viewed
as similar to a public insurance program, 4
If private insurance markets functioned perfectly, society would
not need a consumer bankruptcy system to provide this form of in-
surance. Debtors could instead rely on private contracts to insure
against risks such as illness and unemployment that trigger financial
distress.5 Yet the world is not so perfect. Although consumers cur-
rently can purchase various forms of health, property, and credit in-
surance6 that, like bankruptcy, relieve them of their debt after they
have suffered some reversal of fortune, private insurance may be un-
able to achieve perfect outcomes because of certain well-recognized
market failures. For example, contracting costs may be too high to
allow consumers to negotiate effective insurance against all risks.?
Consumers may also suffer from a host of cognitive or volitional fail-
ures that prevent them from purchasing appropriate insurance or re-
ors] are middle-class—that's what's scary about this.... They are not marginal workers.
They are you and me, they are our neighbors.").
3 Non-bankruptcy law protects some of these assets as well. See infra notes 165-173 and
accompanying text.
4 See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE NILDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN
DEBT 3-6 (2000) (arguing that bankruptcy plays an important role in the larger social
safety net).
5 For studies describing the financial shocks that have led to individual bankruptcies,
see TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS 95-102, 166-77 (1989);
SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 15-22, 75-107, 141-71, 172-98; Teresa A. Sullivan et al.,
Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later: A Financial Comparison of Consumer Bankrupts 1931-1991, 68
Am. SANER. L.J. 121,130-31 (1994).
6 Credit insurance typically insures against risks such as unemployment, disability,
death, and destruction of property. For an overview of credit insurance, see CONSUMER
CREDIT INS. ASS'N, THE 2000 FACT BOOK OE CREDIT-RELATED INSURANCE 4-7 (2000). Con-
sumer advocacy groups have been highly critical of credit insurance. Sec, e.g., Consumers
Union & the Ctr. for Econ. Justice, Credit Insurance: The $2 Billion a Year Rip-Off, Inef-
fective Regulation Fails to Protect Consumers 2-45 (1999), at littp://1%ww. consumersun-
ion.org/pdf/credit.pdf.
7 Some scholars question whether contracting costs can justify the presence of collec-
tions limitations because the frequency of credit transactions may allow the use of stan-
dardized contracts; debtorS could then select a loan based on the forgiveness it offered as
well as its other terms. See, e.g., Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Arm-Breaking, Consumer Credit and Per-
sonal Bankruptcy, 22 ECON. INQUIRY 188,189 (1984).
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sisting the siren song of easy credit. 8 Finally, individuals may have
greater information about their vulnerability to financial distress than
do lenders or insurers, and lenders and insurers may refuse to con-
tract for fear of attracting high-risk individuals, 9
The bankruptcy laws may be viewed as a response to these market
failures. Under this view, the "optimal" bankruptcy system could be
defined as the set of legal rules that best approximates the insurance
contract. that the consumer would purchase if the market failures did
not exist. Unfortunately, a claim that judges should attempt to im-
plement the optimal bankruptcy system provides little guidance be-
cause the literature lacks a good description of such a system. The lit-
erature on consumer bankruptcy has focused on issues such as
whether debtors should be entitled to a complete or limited discharge
of their debts" and whether, and to what extent, debtors should be
entitled to keep certain types of property after bankruptcy. 11 More
recently, scholars have focused on other policy issues such as the per-
centage of a bankrupt debtor's income that should be exempt from
8 See, e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOCHC AND LIMITS Or BANKRUPTCY LAW 232-42
(1986). This Article suggests that bankruptcy insures debtors against their own negligent
financial management. See infra notes 227-244 and accompanying text.
g This is what is known as a "market for lemons" problem. Effectively, insurers believe
that only high-risk individuals will buy insurance and therefore charge high rates. Because
of the high rates, low-risk individuals will not want the insurance and the expectation is
self-fulfilling. See George A. Akerlof, The Me:17*d for "Lemons": Quality, Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcoN. 488, 489-90 (1970) (demonstrating the fundamental
problem by using the used car market as an example); Gillian Lester, Unemployment Insur-
ance and Wealth Redistribution, 49 UCLA L. REV. 335, 361-62 (2001) (applying the lemons
problem to insurance). The "asymmetric" information can have other adverse conse-
quences as well. For example, in the consumer credit context, "good" credit risks may
agree to harsh collections terms, such as no bankruptcy protection, in order to distinguish
themselves from "bad" risks and thus receive lower rates, "Good" risks will find these terms
less costly than "bad" risks because they will default less often. One can construct a model
in which both good and bad credit risks would be better off if these harsh terms were
banned; one can also construct a model, however, in which these harsh terms are neces-
sary to prevent the lemons problem discussed above. For a more thorough explanation of
this problem, see Richard Hynes & Eric A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Consumer Fi-
nance, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV, 168, 173-76 (2002).
10 See, e.g., JACKSoN, supra note 8, at 229-34; Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in
Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 953, 976-91 (1981); Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in
Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 On to Sr. L,J. 1047, 1047-70 (1987).
See, e.g., Vern Countryman, For a New Exemption Policy in Bankruptcy, 14 RuTGEtts L.
REV. 678, 746-48 (1960); Wells M. Engledow, Cleaning Up the Pigsty: Approaching a Consensus
on Exemption Laws, 74 Am. BANKR. L.J. 275, 275-78 (2000); Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions:
Critique and Suggestions, 68 YALE L.J. 1459, 1459 (1959).
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seizure, 12 the extent to which the debtor should have a choice be-
tween complete and limited discharges of debts, 13 and the limitations
on a debtor's freedom to reaffirm pre-bankruptcy debts." Missing
from the literature is a broader inquiry into the bankruptcy system
that debtors and creditors would themselves choose in the absence of
market failure.
To fill this gap in the literature, this Article looks to, and adapts,
current theories regarding the optimal structure of public assistance
programs and taxation. 15 Bankruptcy has obvious similarities to these
programs. Like bankruptcy, public assistance programs provide
benefits to individuals based on their need. 16 Although the type of
benefit is different in bankruptcy than in public assistance pro-
grams—the forgiveness of debts owed to creditors rather than food
stamps or welfare payments financed by the public fist—the systems
are otherwise quite similar. Indeed, public assistance programs are
frequently justified as a form of public insurance," and both the op-
timal bankruptcy system and the optimal public assistance program
would confer their benefits on the truly needy without blunting the
12 See, e.g., Wenli Li, To Forgive or Not to Forgive: An Analysis of U.S. Consumer Bankruptcy
Choices, 87(2) FED. RES. BANK RICHMOND ECON. Q. 1, 15-18, 21 (2001); Hung-jen Wang &
Michelle J. White, An Optimal Personal Bankruptcy Procedure and Proposed Reforms, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 255, 274-86 (2001).
13 See Barry Adler et al., Regulating Consumer Bankruptcy: A Theoretical Inquiry, 29 J. LE-
GAL STuo. 585, 587-601, 605-09 (2000); Jean Braucher, Increasing Uniformity in Consumer
Bankruptcy: Means Testing as a Distraction and the National Bankruptcy Review Commission's
Proposals as a Starting Point, 6 AM, BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 1-11 (1998); A. Mechele Dicker-
son, Bankruptcy Reform: Does the End justify the Means?, 75 AM. BANKR, L.J. 243, 245-46, 269-
77 (2001); judge Edith H. Jones & Todd Zywicki, It's Ti rue for Means-Testing, 1999 BYU L.
REV. 177, 177-83; Elizabeth Warren, The Bankruptcy Crisis, 73 IND. U. 1079, 1080-1101
(1998).
to Sec, e.g., Adler et al., supra note 13, at 601-08; Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M.
White, Debt After Discharge: An Empirical Study of Reaffirmation, 73 AM. BANKR. Lj. 709, 709-
11 (1999); Elizabeth Warren, A Principled Approach to Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR.
U. 483, 498-502 (1997).
15 See generally A.B. Atkinson, Income Maintenance and Social Insurance, in 2 HANDBOOK
or PUBLIC ECONOMICS 779 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 1985) (reviewing
the relevant literature on public assistance); Gary Burtless, The Economist's Lament: Public
Assistance in America, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 57 (1990) (reviewing the relevant literature on pub-
1k assistance); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Pareto Efficient and Optimal Taxation and the New New Welfare
Economics, in 2 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, supra, at 991 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin
Feldstein eds., 1985) (reviewing the relevant literature on taxation).
" See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, America's Uneasy Relationship with the Working Poor, 51
HASTINGS U. 17, 19, 23-25 (1999).
17 See, e.g., Harold M. Hochman & James D. Rodgers, Pareto Optimal Redistribution, 59
AM. ECON. REV. 542, 542-43 (1969).
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incentives for beneficiaries to engage in desirable behavior—for ex-
ample, to work, to save, etc.'s
But bankruptcy' is not just about giving relief to debtors; it is
about taking from them too. Like taxation, bankruptcy often requires
individuals to pay certain sums of money, although the payments in
bankruptcy go to creditors rather than to the public fisc. The goal of
optimal taxation mirrors that of an optimal public assistance pro-
gram: it seeks to extract payments from those capable of paying with-
out diminishing the incentives to engage in productive behavior.
In constructing theories of an optimal public assistance or tax
program, economists usually begin by describing the "first-best" sys-
tem, or the system that society should adopt if the government were
omniscient. 19
 In both cases, the optimal system would impose a fixed
obligation to pay (for taxation) or a fixed benefit (for public assis-
tance) based not on the individual's actual income or assets, but on
the individual's ability to earn.2° While this first-best solution is easy to
describe, it is also trivial in the sense that it has limited application in
the real world where the government is far from omniscient. The so-
lution is, however, still valuable because it establishes a benchmark for
evaluating feasible second-best solutions. Deviations from that
benchmark are then justified by the imperfections in the governmen-
tal processes that run the programs.
The application of optimal tax and public assistance theory to
bankruptcy leads to an interesting insight. In many ways, the Bank-
ruptcy Code appears designed to achieve the first-best solution. This
goal is particularly evident in Chapter 13, which gives debtors not a
complete discharge of their obligations, but merely an adjustment of
debts, 2 i replacing one set of debt. obligations with another that is, ide-
ally, based on the debtor's ability to pay. 22 If that goal were attainable,
the bankruptcy relief conferred would be optimal. It would provide
the debtor with insurance against financial distress with none of the
efficiency losses associated with diminishing the debtor's incentives to
produce and save.
18 See infra notes 45, 102 and accompanying text.
19 See, e.g., Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, The Design of Income Maintenance Pro-
grammes, 62 REV. ECON. Sum. 187, 188, 193-95 (1995).
2° Sec Stiglitz, supra note 15, at 995-96.
21 Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code is entitled, "Adjustment of Debts of an Individ-
ual with Regular Income." 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (2000).
22 See id.
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Yet, as in taxation and public assistance, the first-best solution in
bankruptcy is also an unrealistically utopian solution because judges
lack the information necessary to accurately measure a debtor's ability
to pay and to determine whether the debtor deserves relief. Because
of this, judges cannot prevent all debtor misbehavior. Just as the opos-
sum plays dead to ward off predators, bankruptcy may cause some
debtors to exaggerate their plight in order to avoid repayment or gain
a greater amount of relief; call this the "opossum problem." It occurs,
for example, when a debtor conceals assets or hides his ability to earn
by working less than he is capable of working. In addition, just as the
grasshopper fails to plan for the coining winter, 23 the possibility of
bankruptcy relief may cause some debtors to live beyond their means
or engage in other negligent or even willful misbehavior that makes
financial distress more likely; call this the "grasshopper problem." Un-
like the opossum, the grasshopper's need is real, though it could have
been avoided. In a world with such problems, the optimal bankruptcy
system is a second-best solution—meaning one that accounts for the
limited ability of courts to identify the grasshoppers and opossums
among us and for the inevitable distortion of debtor incentives.
It is here, however, that the Bankruptcy Code is notably deficient.
In many instances, the Code gives little guidance to courts that must
adjust the utopian goal to the realities of the actual world. In re-
sponse, courts have improvised. They have seized on the discretion
granted them explicitly or implicitly by the Bankruptcy Code and
have attempted to develop a second-best bankruptcy system that ac-
counts for their own limitations." In many respects, these improvisa-
tions parallel solutions developed in implementing tax and public as-
sistance programs, 25 This Article concludes that most of this judicial
improvisation is both necessary as a matter of policy and consistent.
with the language of the existing Bankruptcy Code. 26
23 In Aesop's fable of the ant and the grasshopper, the grasshopper plays the summer
away while the ant toils to save for winter. There are numerous versions of this fable and
they differ largely on how the grasshopper is treated in the winter. Sec, e.g., AESOP'S FA B LES
23 ( Jacob Lawrence, Illus., U. Wash. Press, 1997). Several prominent bankruptcy scholars
have used the story of the ant and the grasshopper to explain the moral hazard created by
bankruptcy. See, e.g., Jones & Zywicki, supra note 13, at 219-20; Lynn M. LoPticki, Common
Sense Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. I5ANKR. L.J. 461, 463-65 (1997); Warren, supra note 13,
at 1084. This Article adopts an expanded definition of the grasshopper problem that in-
cludes willful misbehavior, such as a willful and malicious tort, that makes financial distress
more likely.
24 Sec infra notes 325-330 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 62-67.95 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 407-424 and accompanying text.
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Bankruptcy judges do not deny relief to the spendthrift or the
negligent" and, despite frequent discussion of the grasshopper prob-
lem,28
 few, if any, academics argue that bankruptcy judges should,
Perhaps this should not surprise us. Neither public insurance pro-
grams nor private insurance contracts deny relief to the negligent,
and the standard explanations for this approach apply to bankruptcy
as wel1. 28
 Both public insurance programs and private insurance con-
tracts, however, deny relief for willful misconduct." Here bankruptcy,
or more specifically Chapter 13, provides an exception, in the form of
a superdischarge that would even relieve the debtor of a judgment. for
a willful and malicious tort. such as sexual assaults ] Most bankruptcy
judges limit the impact. of this anomaly by using the good faith stan-
dard of Chapter 13 to restrict access to the superdischarge to those
debtors who have received other punishment. and who try to repay as
much as possible. 32
Recently, scholars have paid more attention to the opossum prob-
lem in the form of proposals for means testing that would test
whether a debtor can repay any of his debts." Rather than engage in
this debate, this Article focuses on the only major consumer bank-
ruptcy chapter that requires debtors to repay out of future income:
Chapter 13. 3  Though the text of Chapter 13 appears to invoke the
utopian approach of adjusting debts based on a debtor's ability to pay,
judges resist this approach because they are skeptical of their own
ability to estimate a debtor's future income." This causes some judges
to adopt a strained reading of the Code that effectively creates a tax
on the debtor's income in bankruptcy." This approach is unfortunate
because judges could address their concerns in ways that do less vio-
lence to the plain meaning of the Bankruptcy Code and better use
27 See infra notes 228-234 and accompanying text.
.28 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
29
 See infra notes 120-131 and accompanying text.
so See infra notes 142-148 and accompanying text.
31
 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (2000); see, e.g., Solomon v. Cosby, 67 F.3d 1128, 1130 (4th Cir.
1995); Petty v. Belanger, 232 B.R. 543, 545 (D. Mass. 1999) (decided under Chapter 7,
although debtor originally filed for Bankruptcy under Chapter 13); In re Carsrmi, 161 B.R.
246, 247 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1993).
32 See Win note 284 and accompanying text.
n See supra note 13 and accompanying text
24
 As discussed below, debtors filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 need not repay
anything out of their future income. Sec infra note 177 and accompanying text.
35 See infra notes 325-330 and accompanying text.
36
 Sec infirm note 307 and accompanying text.
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what abilities they do have.37 Specifically, judges could rely on subse-
quent modifications to a bankruptcy plan when they can provide a
workable estimate of the debtor's future income, and should dismiss a
debtor's bankruptcy petition when they cannot. 38
Part I provides a brief outline of the optimal taxation and public
assistance literatures and the theory of the second-best. Part II applies
the lessons of this literature to the bankruptcy context and defines the
utopian and second-best bankruptcy systems. Part III compares these
bankruptcy systems to the existing Bankruptcy Code and argues that,
although several aspects of Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code ap-
pear to try to implement a utopian bankruptcy system, judges should
instead consider the limits of their abilities and work to implement
the second-best system within the constraints of the current language
of the Bankruptcy Code."
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO OPTIMAL TAXATION AND PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
This Article seeks to define the optimal bankruptcy procedure in
the abstract and to determine the extent to which this procedure
should guide judicial analysis of existing legislation. To accomplish
this goal, this Article analogizes the search for an optimal bankruptcy
procedure to a well-known problem in economics: the search for an
optimal program of progressive taxation and public assistance. 40
For at least the past one hundred years, economists have tried to
define optimal progressive taxation and public assistance programs to
deal with the problems of poverty and inequality.'" Modern analyses
of these redistributive programs view them either as a form of altru-
ism or insurance. 42 The insurance argument takes one of two forms.
37 See infra notes 331-333 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 331-333 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 163-406 and accompanying text.
" Although public assistance could take the form of a negative income tax such as the
earned income tax credit, these problems are often treated separately in the literature. See,
e.g., Atkinson, supra note 15, at 782, 804-06; Burtless, supra note 15, at 68-77; Slights, supra
note 15, at 1038. The differences in these literatures, however, are unimportant for the
purposes of this Article.
41 Sec Stiglitz, supra now. 15, at 991 ("For more than a hundred years, economists have
attempted to show that progressive taxation can be justified on more fundamental princi-
ples.").
42 See, e.g., Hochman & Rodgers, supra note 17, at 542-43. Earlier efforts at justifying
progressive taxation and public assistance relied on the idea that redistribution would
increase aggregate happiness because the poor value an additional dollar of income more
than the rich. See, e.g., NEIL BRUCE, PUBLIC FINANCE AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 213-19
(2d ed. 2001). This approach received a great deal of criticism because it assumes that the
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First, many forms of public assistance, such as unemployment insur-
ance, may provide real insurance to existing individuals as the high-
income individuals of today may be poor tomorrow and thus may
theniselves benefit from the relief provided.° Second, other redis-
tributive policies, such as progressive taxation, may insure the indi-
vidual against the lottery of birth that grants some individuals the abil-
ity to earn very little and others the ability to earn a great deal."
Regardless, the concept is roughly the same. The government should
choose the redistributive program that an individual would choose
before he knew the outcome of the risk against which the system is
designed to insure, the system that he would choose behind a "veil of
ignorance. "45
Economic articles on taxation or public assistance usually pro-
ceed in two steps. First the author defines the first-best system, or the
system that the government should implement if it were omniscient
and could directly solve the opossum and the grasshopper problems
described above. 46
 But economists generally do not believe that the
government is omniscient, and they focus more heavily on the de-
scription of the second-best system that is optimal in a world of opos-
sums, grasshoppers, and a government that can only imperfectly iden-
tify t hem. 47
government can compare the happiness of different individuals. See, e,g,joseph Bankman
& Thomas Griffeth, Social Welfarr and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75
CAL. L. REv. 1905, 1917-18 (1987). For a review of the development of the justifications
for these redistributive policies, see Atkinson, supra note 15, at 791-95.
43 See, e.g., BRUCE, supra note 42, at 209-13.
44
 See John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility in It
	 Economics and in the Theory of Risk-
Taking, 61 j. Pot.. ECON. 434, 434-35 (1953); John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individual-
ist Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. Poi.. ECON. 309, 314-16 (1955); see also
Atkinson, supra note 15, at 793-95 (discussing the insurance justifications of redistributive
programs).
" The reader may associate this term with the work of John Rawls. See JOHN RAWLS, A
ToEokv Or jus•icr; 12, 136-42 (1971). In Rawls's version of the veil of ignorance argu-
ment, the debtor is not just ignorant as to whether he will be rich or poor in the future,
but is also ignorant as to the chance of each circumstance occurring. Id. at 12. 137. There-
fore, according to Rawls, an individual would want an equal distribution of income unless
an unequal distribution aids the most disadvantaged member of society See id. at 148-49.
This conclusion has some importance for the interpretation of the second-best tax dis-
cussed below. Differences between Rawls's work and the earlier work of Harsanyi, however,
are not central to this Article.
46 See.	 Besley & Coate, supm note 19, at 188, 193-95.
47 See id. at 188, 195-205.
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A. The First-Best Tax or Transfer
An omniscient government can adopt an elegantly simple first,
best tax or transfer system that allows it to achieve whatever social
goals it desires without any loss of efficiency: the first-best system im-
poses on individuals a lump-sum tax or provides to individuals a lump-
sum transfer based on their ability to pay. 48 To implement this system,
the government projects how much each individual would earn if lie
worked the efficient number of hours and then requires the individ-
ual to pay an amount equal to any projected earnings in excess of the
amount that the government decides the individual should consume.
If the individual's projected earnings are less than the expenses that
the government thinks proper, the government gives the individual a
transfer equal to the shortfall. For example, assume that the govern-
ment determines that all individuals should consume $50,000 worth
of goods and services. If the government determines that a high-
ability individual should work hard enough to earn $90,000, it will re-
quire that individual to pay a tax of $40,000 regardless of the amount
that he earns. If the government determines that a low-ability individ-
ual should only have to work hard enough to earn $10,000, it will give
that individual a transfer of $40,000 regardless of the amount that he
actually earns.
Each individual may work more or less than the government es-
timated, but the amount that the individual works, and therefore the
amount that he actually earns, does not affect his tax or transfer; that.
is the meaning of a lump-sum tax. Because individuals' actual earn-
ings do not affect their tax or transfer, their return from working an
additional hour, their take-home pay, matches the social return, the
amount that they produce, and they will work die efficient number of
hours that the omniscient government predicted. For example, the
high-ability individual could work harder and earn $100,000. If he
did, he would be entitled to keep the extra $10,000 that he earned.
He would, however, not value the additional $10,000 as much as the
leisure that he would have to sacrifice in order to earn it. If he did
value the additional $10,000 more than the leisure he had to sacrifice
to get it, then it would not have been efficient for him to work only
enough to earn $90,000, and the omniscient government would have
determined that he should work enough to earn $100,000. Therefore,
48 See, e.g,, Stiglitz, supra note 15, at 995-96.
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the high-ability individual ends up earning. the $90,000 that the om-
niscient government predicts.
This does not mean that the first-best tax will not affect the num-
ber of hours that the individual will work. In fact, the tax will likely
cause the individual to work more hours than he would have because
lie will be less wealthy and will therefore be willing to sacrifice more
leisure in order to gain more income. For example, if the government
requires our high-ability individual to pay a tax of $90,000 and he
earns only $90,000, he would be left with nothing to eat. To avoid
starvation, he would be willing to work a great deal in order to earn
just a little more than the government will take. This wealth effect,
however, is irrelevant to the question of whether the tax is efficient.°
A tax is efficient if, given the current amount of tax the individual
must pay, the individual values an hour of leisure more than the
amount of money he could produce by working an additional hour. A
lump-sum tax is efficient because an individual is free to work another
hour and keep the entire amount that he produces, but he chooses
not to do so.
The government can use a lump-sum tax to achieve as much pro-
gressivity as it desires without any loss of efficiency. 5° Each individual
would work an efficient number of hours if the high-ability individual
paid a tax of $40,000 and the low-ability individual received a transfer
of $40,000 or if the high-ability individual paid no tax and the low-
ability individual received no transfer. To determine the amount. of
each tax or transfer, one must consider the purpose of the program.
Assume that the program is motivated by insurance so that the gov-
ernment chooses the program that an individual would choose if he
did not know how he would fare in a lottery of birth that gives some
individuals the ability to earn $90,000 and some the ability to earn just
" When studying the effect of income taxation, economists refer to two effects, the
wealth (or income) effect and the substitution effect. The wealth effect refers to the ten-
dency of individuals to work more because taxes make them poorer and hence they value
an additional dollar of income more highly and are willing to sacrifice more leisure to get
it. 'Ile substitution effect refers to the fact that the individual does not get to keep all of
the last dollar earned. The tax therefore makes leisure cheaper and the individual substi-
tutes leisure for work. It is the substitution effect, and not the wealth effect, that deter-
mines the efficiency of a tax. See, e.g.. Bruce, supra note 42, at 428-32 (describing the in-
come and substitution effects in the context of an income tax).
5° See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 15, at 995-96 (noting that optimal lump-sum taxes can
equalize the consumption of each individual and yet still provide each individual with the
incentive to work an amount such that her marginal rate of substitution between goods
and leisure equals her marginal product).
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$10,000." Assume further that the happiness that an individual de-
rives from an additional dollar of consumption depends only on how
much lie is consuming, 52 and that as the individual consumes more
each additional dollar yields less happiness. If these assumptions hold,
the government should set the first-best tax or transfer such that the
individual will always consume the same amount regardless of his abil-
ity to earn; 53 the government should structure the program so that
the low-ability individual and the high-ability individual will each con-
sume $50,000. Because each is consuming the same amount, each
would place the same value on an additional dollar of consumption
and there would be no gain from redistributing wealth from one to
the other. The government would demand that the high-ability indi-
vidual pay a tax equal to $40,000, or the amount by which his pro-
jected earnings of $90,000 exceed $50,000 and offer a transfer to the
low-ability individual of $40,000 or the amount by which his projected
earnings of $10,000 fall below $50,000.
B. The Second-Best and Moral Hazard
The first-best system described above effectively assumes away the
moral hazards (the grasshopper and opossum problems) that redis-
tributive programs create by assuming that the government is omnis-
cient. If the government cannot identify the high-ability individuals,
these individuals will have an incentive to "play 'possum" and claim a
low earnings ability in order to pay a lower tax or receive a larger
transfer. For example, the political debate over whether welfare re-
St Because many public assistance programs do not appear to be structured to serve an
insurance motive, economists often view them as a product of altruism or at least limited
altruism. See, e.g., Besley & Coate, supra note 19, at 189. Still, even under these assumptions
the first-best system is just a lump-sum tax based on recipients' ability to support them-
selves. Id. at 188.
52 This assumption is more controversial than it appears. For example, one might
think that the amount of leisure available may affect the happiness an additional dollar
yields.
53 The government will assign each individual a consumption level such that the hap-
piness that each indivklual would derive from an additional dollar of consumption, Isis
marginal utility of consumption, would be the same. If this were not the case, aggregate
happiness could be increased by redistributing money to those who valued it more highly.
If all individuals have the same preferences and the happiness that they derive from an
additional dollar of income depends solely on how much they are consuming, then every
individual must consume the same amount. See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 15, at 995-96. This
does not mean that all individuals are equally happy; in fact, those who can earn more are
likely worse off because the government will expect them to work more as long as leisure is
a "normal" good. Sec id. at 995.
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cipients can in fact support themselves" is an argument over the im-
portance of the opossum problem. It. is a debate over whether the re-
cipients are truly needy or whether they can support themselves. In
addition, if the government. cannot. distinguish between those whose
low-ability is a result of bad luck and those who failed to invest
sufficiently in the future, individuals will have an incentive to behave
like the grasshopper. The debate over whether welfare laws lead to
more teen pregnancies 55 is a debate over the grasshopper problem.
All would agree that the teenage mother is needy, but some would
argue that she would not have become needy but for the prospect of
relief. 56
 To the extent that the government cannot identify either the
opossums or the grasshoppers, the optimal tax is a second-best tax.
1. The Grasshopper Problem and Partial Insurance
The optimal taxation literature sometimes assumes that each in-
dividual receives his earnings ability randomly through a lottery of
birth;57
 it effectively ignores the grasshopper problem. One's ability to
earn, however, often depends on prior choices such as the decision to
seek further education or to work hard and earn a promotion. Al-
though a lump-sum tax based on an individual's earnings ability
would not distort his decision to work after the tax is implemented,
the individual will have much less incentive to develop the ability to
earn if he knows that the tax will be implemented. If the taxation sys-
tem will leave everyone with the same amount of money to consume,
there is no incentive to become skilled. 58 For example, assume that in
order to become a high-ability individual capable of earning $90,000 a
year, an individual must endure several years of rigorous study. If one
knew that the tax structure was such that one would consume $50,000
54 See Dickerson, supra note 16, at 17-18.
55 See. e.g., STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 105th Cong., 1998 GREEN
BOOK 537, 537-41 (Comm. Print 1998).
56 Id. (arguing that some teens would not have become pregnant but for the existence
of a social welfare system).
57 See Louis Kaplow, Human Capital Under an Ideal Income Tax, 80 VA. L. Rev. 1477,
1482-90 (1994) (describing the endowment at birth with quantifiable earning potential,
discountable to present value). But sec Lawrence Zelenak, The Reification of Metaphor: Income
Taxes, Consumption Taxes and Human Capital, 51 TAX L. REA'. 1, 7-11 (1995) (arguing,
among other things, that human capital endowment is not always a good proxy for earn-
ings potential).
58 1n fact, individuals may actually be worse off if they have a higher earnings ability. If
leisure is a "normal" good so that individuals would want to consume more of it as its price
(the available wage) falls, then the government will expect them to work more hours and
yet consume the same amount as others. See Stiglitz, supra note 15, at 995.
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regardless of how much one could earn, there would be no incentive
for one to study.
An omniscient government. can solve the grasshopper problem. If
some individuals have low earnings ability solely because of hard luck
and others have low earnings ability solely because of their poor
choices, the government could provide relief for the unfortunate but
not the lazy. More realistically, both hard work and fate play a role in
determining an individual's earnings ability. An omniscient govern-
ment, however, can still implement a first-best tax or transfer system
by assessing an arbitrarily high tax, effectively a punishment, when-
ever the individual does not invest sufficiently in his future. Because
individuals will fear this penalty, they will not shirk.
If the government cannot separate the grasshoppers from the
unfortunate, then the only way to make the individual bear the full
costs of shirking is to make the individual bear the full costs of adverse
events beyond his control as well. The only way to provide the indi-
vidual with the proper incentives to study and generate the ability to
earn $90,000 is never to provide relief when he may earn only
$10,000, even if this low earnings ability could have resulted from mis-
fortune rather than misbehavior. Because this would destroy the in-
surance that redistributive programs are designed to provide, the gov-
ernment again faces a trade-off, It must balance its citizens' need for
insurance against the fact that this insurance will cause its citizens to
shirk. What results is a system of only partial insurance. Low-ability
individuals are asked to pay less than high-ability individuals, but not
enough less to make them equally well-off. The resulting system is still
progressive, just not as progressive as it would have been if the gov-
ernment could solve the grasshopper problem directly. Likewise, pub-
lic insurance programs offer the individual only partial insurance
against his loss. For example, unemployment insurance typically pays
about one-half of the unemployed's former wages. 59
2. The Opossum Problem and Income Taxes
Even if the government could not estimate an individual's earn-
ings ability, a lump-sum tax or transfer would still have the desirable
effect on each individual's work incentives because the individual
59 See, e.g., MARK A. RoTtis'ilim ET Al.., EMPLOYMENT LAw 799 (2c1 ed. 1999) ("States
usually set weekly benefit amounts as 1/23, 1/24, 1/25, or 1/26 of the earnings obtained
by applicants during the relevant calendar quarters, resulting in benefit amounts ranging
from 50 to 56% of average weekly earnings:).
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would retain all of his last dollar earned regardless of the size of the
tax or transfer.° If the government cannot identify those who can
earn more, however, all individuals must pay the exact same amount
of tax or else those who are asked to pay more would "play 'possum"
and claim that they have a low earnings ability. The government could
not meet its progressivity goals with such a system.
The optimal tax literature therefore focuses on the second-best.
tax or transfer, or the tax that. utilizes only the information that the
government can actually observe. 61 In the basic optimal taxation
model the government can observe the individual's actual income but
nothing else.° A precise description of the second-best tax is quite
complicated and requires strong mathematical assumptions.° This
Article, however, need only describe the second-best tax as a tax that
generalbh4
 increases with the individual's actual income; the second-
best tax is an income tax. Because an income tax deprives individuals
of some of the benefit of an additional hour of work, it will discourage
them from working and thus lead to some inefficiency: 65
 An income
tax allows for some progressivity, however, as the high-ability individ-
ual would have to earn, and therefore consume, very little in order to
"play 'possum" and emulate the low-ability individual. This second-
best tax reflects a compromise between the goals of efficiency and
60 Sec Slights, supra note 15, at 996-1004.
61 See, e.g., Besley & Coate, supra note 19, at 195-205 (exploring the optimal system of
public assistance): Stiglitz, supra note 15, at 996-1023 (reviewing the basic lessons of the
literature).
62 See Stiglitz, supra note 15, at 997. A significant portion of the public assistance litera-
ture discusses the use of other proxies to tag individuals deserving of relief or the inten-
tional design of programs to screen those able to support themselves. See, e.g., George A.
Akerlof, The Economics of "Tagging" as Applied to the Optimal Income Tax, Welfare Programs, and
Manpower Planning, 68 Am. EcoN. Rev. 8, 8 (1978). In addition, the government may be
able to punish recipients in order to dissuade those who can support themselves from
seeking assistance. See, e.g., Besley & Coate, supra note 19, at 188 (discussing the use of
"workfare" to screen for those debtors with a low earnings capacity). While punishment
mechanisms such as the loss of one's credit reputation undoubtedly could play an impor-
tant role in an optimal bankruptcy system, they are beyond the scope of this Article.
63
 See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 15, at 1023-30.
64
 Under some a.sstimptions the optimal income tax may actually decline over sonic
ranges of income. See, e.g., id. at 1022.
65
 In theory, it is possible that the wealth effect could dominate the substitution effect
and the individual could decide to work more after the imposition of an income tax. This
makes little difference, however, because only the substitution effect has any bearing on
whether a tax is efficient. See supra note •2 and accompanying text.
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progressivity. 66 Because society must compromise, the second-best tax
is neither as progressive nor as efficient as the first-best tax. 67
IL APPLYING THE OPTIMAL TAN LESSONS TO BANKRUPTCY
This Part applies the results of the optimal taxation and public
assistance literature to bankruptcy and demonstrates that the first-
best, or utopian, bankruptcy system adjusts the debts of a deserving
debtor to an amount. that is commensurate with the debtor's potential
to repay." Like the first-best tax, however, this utopian bankruptcy
system relies on information that is not realistically available. 69 There-
fore, one needs to define a feasible second-best bankruptcy system.
In a world of limited information, we may not want judges to
search for all of the grasshoppers among us for fear that they may mis-
takenly deny relief to the deserving. In addition, the ability of judges
to identify the opossums depends on the information that they have
at their disposal, and on this matter reasonable minds may disagree. If
one follows the fairly pessimistic assumptions of the optimal taxation
literature and assumes that judges can only observe a debtor's actual
income, the optimal bankruptcy system resembles an income tax. 70
This Article argues, however, that judges can sometimes use a debtor's
earnings history to provide a workable estimate of an individual's po-
tential earnings:71 When they can, judges should instead adopt an ad-
justment of debts approach to bankruptcy tempered by subsequent
modifications of the amount of debt when the estimation proves
grossly inaccurate.
Like progressive taxation or public assistance, bankruptcy policy
may be justified either as a means of providing insurance for debtors
or as fulfilling certain altruistic goals of society. 72 While this Article
66 See Stiglitz, supra note 15, at 1006 (noting the equity-efficiency tradeoff).
67
 See id.
68 See infra notes 101-114 and accompanying text.
69 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text,
70 See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 420-422 and accompanying text.
72 Economists consider an individual altruistic if his happiness depends at least in part
on the condition of others. See Hochman & Rodgers, supra note 17, at 543. Because altruis-
tic individuals do not want to see their neighbor destitute, they may prefer a system like
bankruptcy that makes extreme poverty less likely. Because it is the creditor, and, Ma-
'timely, debtors themselves who bear the cost of this insurance, bankruptcy offers some
advantages over public assistance financed from the public fist. In particular, public assis-
tance may encourage debtors to engage in risky financial behavior, such as over-borrowing,
because public assistance partially shields them from the consequences of their actions. Sec
Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HAND'. L. REV. 1393, 1402
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focuses on the insurance that bankruptcy provides, the policy pre-
scriptions would not radically change if altruism were stressed:73 Not-
withstanding the commercial success of Las Vegas and Atlantic City,
consumers generally do not like risk and purchase insurance even
though, on average, they pay more to the insurers than the insurers
pay out in claims. 74 The insurer writes these contracts because the
consumer pays a premium that exceeds the expected payments on the
insurance contract. The insurer can charge premiums that the con-
sumer is willing to pay because the insurer writes contracts with many
different consumers and is therefore fairly indifferent to the risk that
any one consumer may suffer an unfortunate event that. requires
compensation. 75
 In other words, the insurer can effectively "diversify"
the risk away." Consumers choose contracts that balance the insur-
ance that they receive against the premium that they must pay.
Bankruptcy effectively makes creditors the insurer of their debt-
ors by transferring wealth from creditors to debtors, through a reduc-
tion in debts, after debtors have suffered some misfortune." Many
(1985); Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconseionability Doc-
trine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STun. 283,
286 (1995). The fact that the public fist does not bear the costs of bankruptcy, however,
makes it difficult to offer a prediction of how the altruist would set the debtor's consump-
tion in bankruptcy. Assume that the debtor's consumption in bankruptcy is set by au altru-
ist who is not also a borrower, If the altruist is a true altruist and seeks to maximize the
debtor's expected happiness, the altruist would just choose the same bankruptcy proce-
dure that the debtor herself would choose in an insurance model. Therefore, assume that
the altruist cares only about the debtor's consumption. Because the altruist does not have
to pay for the debtor's consumption. the debtor pays for it through higher interest rates
and reduced access to credit; there is nothing to limit the debtor's choice. This is not to
say that altruism plays no role; the altruist may care about some combination of the
debtor's happiness or consumption or may only care that these stay above certain levels.
This Article will focus, however, on the insurance role of bankruptcy to avoid this confu-
sion.
7s
 The utopian bankruptcy system would still leave the debtor with a fixed obligation.
The amount of this obligation, however, would be determined by the amount that the
altruist would choose for the debtor rather than the amount that the debtor would choose
from behind a veil of ignorance. As explained above, however, the amount that the altruist
would choose is uncertain, See supra note 72.
74
 The profitability of insurance companies is based on the premise that they will re-
ceive more premiums than they will pay in claims. See, e.g., A. Mraltim, 1 1 01.INSKY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 54 (2d ed. 1989).
75 See id.
76 Sec id.
77 Sec infra notes 203-204, 228 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of con-
sumer bankruptcy as insurance, see Charles G. Hallinan, The Fresh Start Theory in Consumer
Bankruptcy: A Historical Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. Ittc,n. L. licv. 49, 98-109
(1986).
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creditors willingly supply this insurance by extending credit while
knowing that their debtors may file for bankruptcy. Like the insur-
ance company, the large creditor contracts with many consumers and
can diversify away much of the risk of any one consumer's suffering
the adverse circumstances that lead to default. 78 Just as the insurer
demands compensation for the risk through premiums, most credi-
tors demand compensation for the risk of default through higher in-
terest rates. 79
Because lending markets are highly competitive' and money can
be readily invested outside the consumer lending market, 81 debtors
are likely to bear most if not all of the cost of bankruptcy protection
in the form of higher interest rates or reduced access to credit. 82
78 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
75 See, e.g., Hallinan, supra note 77, at 105.
S0 Credit markets may not be perfectly competitive. Some consumer credit markets,
however, such as those for credit card debt or mortgages, are now truly national markets
and it would be very difficult to claim that any lender truly has market power. In addition,
state and federal regulatory structures work to prevent excessive concentration in local
lending markets. Furthermore, there is some evidence that different types of lenders—
banks, finance companies, etc.—compete for the consumer's business. See, e.g., A.
Charlene Sullivan, Competition in the Mathet for Consumer Loans, 36 j. ECON. & Bus. 141, 141
(1984).
Si Even if consumer lenders are unable to invest readily in other sources, they are only
financial intermediaries. The ultimate source of credit, the individuals who own the wealth
that is lent, can choose from among a dizzying array of investments including domestic
and foreign securities and banks that loan to corporations. See, e.g., William EL Meckling,
Financial Markets, Default, and Bankruptcy: The Role of the State, 41(4) LAW & CONTEN1P.
PROBS. 13, 19 (1977).
According to economists, the question of who bears the cost of bankruptcy is an-
swered by examining the elasticity of the supply and demand for credit. If credit markets
were perfectly competitive and if consumer lending were but a small part of the overall
investment opportunities, then the supply of credit would be perfectly elastic. That is, if
the return to lending increased even infinitesimally above the return to other forms of
lending, then money would flow into the consumer lending market Lindl the return fell to
the normal level. Likewise, if the return decreased, money would flow out until the return
rose to the normal level. Therefore, if generous bankruptcy laws increase the rate of de-
fault, then money will flow out of the consumer lending market until interest rates rise to
raise the expected return of lending to the normal level. Sec id. at 19-24. Of course, some
question the elasticity of the supply of credit and thus question whether creditors and in-
vestors will bear more of the costs of bankruptcy. See, e.g., J. Fred Weston, Some Economic
Fundamentals for an Analysis of Bankruptcy, 41(4) LAW & CONTENIP. PROBS. 47, 48-51 (1977).
Empirical evidence suggests that consumers do bear at least some of the costs of laws that
restrict collections. See, e.g., Reim Gropp et al., Personal Bankruptcy and Credit Supply and
Demand, 112 Q. j. ECON. 217, 230-31 (1997) (finding that debtors who live in states with
larger property exemptions pay higher interest rates and have a reduced access to credit).
The primary results of this Article, however, do not depend on how much of the costs of
bankruptcy are borne by lenders. Even if the lenders incurred much of the costs of bank-
ruptcy, debtors would still have an incentive to choose an efficient means of collection
because they could then extract a more generous system. Note too that bankruptcy will
"4,
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Therefore, the optimal bankruptcy procedure is the bankruptcy pro-
cedure a rational debtor would include in a hypothetical contract
made at the time of borrowing if the debtor knew that the amount of
insurance and the structure of the contract would affect the other
terms of credit offered by the creditor. The optimal bankruptcy sys-
tem, like the optimal tax, is the system that an individual consumer
would choose at the time of borrowing behind a veil of ignorance as
to his future condition. 83
In assessing the debtor's ability to pay, the optimal bankruptcy
procedure would likely consider several factors including the value of
the debtor's assets and any unusual expenses that the debtor faces.
This Article follows the general approach of the optimal taxation and
public assistance literature, however, and focuses solely on the
debtor's earnings. 84 One can extend the analysis to consider the
debtor's assets and expenses, but the gain in realism would not be
worth the resulting analytical complications at this time. 85 The vast
majority of bankrupt debtors do not have, 86
 and likely never had, 87
significant assets. In addition, while unexpected expenses, such as a
hospital bill, are often cited as a cause of bankruptcy, 88 these expenses
are often one-time events that affect the total obligations of debtors
but not their expenses going forward. Therefore, they do not affect.
the total amount that debtors should pay in bankruptcy. In addition,
provide a net benefit if consumers value the insurance provided more than the additional
costs of credit. Therefore, bankruptcy could actually expand the demand for credit, and, if
the supply of credit is not perfectly elastic, creditors could actually capture much of the
gain from bankruptcy. Therefore, the relevant question is whether the insurance provided
by bankruptcy is more valuable than the costs of the distortions it creates. See, e.g., Daniel J.
Villegas, Regulation of Creditor Practices: An Evaluation of the FTC's Credit Practice Rule, 42 J.
Ecor4. & Bus. 51, 56-64 (1990) (testing whether limitations on credit provide a net benefit
to consumers and lenders).
"See analogous discussion, supra note 45 and accompanying text.
84
 See supra notes 20, 49 and accompanying text.
85
 The author plans to revisit these issues in a future paper.
86
 See, e.g., ELIZABETH WARREN & jay LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS
AND CREnrroRs 426 (4th ed. 2001) ("The property exemptions may make little difference
because the debtors who file for bankruptcy may not own much of value that isn't already
mortgaged to the hilt.").
87
 According to the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances, half of all non-homeowners
had a net worth of less than $4,200. See Arthur B. Ke llll ickell et al., Recent Changes in U.S.
Family Finances: Results from the 1998 Survey of ConsumerFinances, Fed. Res. Bull. 7 ( Jan.
2000), available at http://wwwiederalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/98/bn110100.pdf .
Moreover, this low net worth does not appear solely attributable to an excess of debts. Only
63.5% of these non-homeowners listed any debts at all, and of those that did list debts, half
had debts of less than $6,000. See id. at 21.
88 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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many bankruptcy scholars have abandoned faith in the ability of
bankruptcy judges effectively to estimate a debtor's reasonably neces-
sary expenses,89 and both the National Bankruptcy Review Commis-
sion's proposed reforms99 and proposed legislation91 would limit con-
sideration of the debtor's particular expenses in the great majority of
filings.
The analogy between optimal bankruptcy and optimal taxation
or redistribution is imperfect. Many of the limitations of the analogy
are discussed below, but two points deserve special note. First, when
implementing a tax or public assistance program, the government
may transfer as much wealth to an individual as it wishes, provided
that it raises enough money to balance its budget. By contrast, the
bankruptcy judge can do no more than forgive all of the debtor's ob-
ligations; even in a hypothetical bankruptcy regime it would be odd
for a judge to order a creditor to transfer additional funds to a debtor
in default.92
Second, while the optimal tax defines how all members of society
should be treated, only an extremely small fraction of the population
files for bankruptcy. 93 The number of bankruptcy filings is even small
when compared to the number of individuals who experience the ml-
99 See, e.g.. Braucher, supra note 13, at 19. Currently § 1325(b) of the Bankruptcy Code
defines -disposable income" as income minus reasonably necessary expenses. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325(b) (2000).
90 See, e.g., NAT'L BANKR. REV. Costn'N, BANXRUP'ECY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 262-
73 (1997) (hereinafter NBRC REPoterj. Interestingly, one of the leading advisors to this
commission, Elizabeth Warren, is one of the leading advocates for the argument that un-
expected expenses often lead to bankruptcy. See supra note 5. This issue fits firmly within
the theory of the second-best. While the first-hest solution would adjust debtors' required
repayment for their reasonably necessary expenses, judges may be unable to determine
this amount. To the extent that they are unable to do so, differences in expenses must be
ignored.
"' Sec H.R. 5745, 107th Cong. § 707(b) (2) (A) (2002).
92 One can obscure, at least temporarily, this distinction by assuming that debtors can
over-borrow from the creditor and store the amount that they do not consume in a riskless
asset so that the debtor will always repay something after default. The need for this as-
sumption, however, has important implications for bankruptcy law that will be discussed
below. See infra note 290 and accompanying text.
95 In the year 2001 there were approximately 1,452,000 non-business bankruptcy
filings. Sec Am. Bankr. Inst., U.S. Bankruptcy Filings 1980-2001, available at
http://www.abiworld.org/stats/1980annualluml [hereinafter Bankruptcy Filings 1980-
2001]. The population of the United States in the year 2001 was approximately
275,000,000. See U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Annual Projections of the
Total Resident Population as of July 1: Middle, Lowest, Highest, and Zero International
Migration Series, 1999 to 2100, available at http://www.census.gov/population/projec-
tions/nation/summary/np-tl.pdf [hereinafter Annual Projections of the Resident Popula-
tion].
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fortunate events that are often listed as causing the financial distress
that leads to bankruptcy: unemployment, divorce, etc. 94 if consumers
are risk-averse, they should want insurance against all shocks, not just
those that are severe enough to land them in bankruptcy. Therefore,
the fact. that bankruptcy provides no insurance to debtors except in
those very rare circumstances when they fail to pay their obligations
in full presents somewhat. of a puzzle.
This puzzle is not. unique to bankruptcy. Perhaps part of the an-
swers' can be found in an argument economists use to explain why
many insurance policies only cover losses above some amottnt. 90 This
literature suggests that the cost. of verifying the insured's loss prevents
the insurance contract front covering small losses, 97
 Economists ex-
tend the same logic to bankruptcy and suggest that because bank-
ruptcy is a costly process, a court should only inquire as to the
debtor's circumstances when the debtor's income is particularly low. 98
94
 In 1998 there were a total of 1,135,000 divorces (including annulments) in the U.S.
Sec Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Divorce, available at
lutp://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/divorce.htm . In addition, in 1998, there were a total of
6,210,000 unemployed persons in the U.S. See U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dept of Com-
merce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 404 (2000) [hereinafter Statistical Ab-
stract]. In that same year there were 1,398,182 non-business bankruptcy filings. See Bank-
ruptcy Filings 1980-2001, supra note 93. Of course this represents the number of filings
and not the number of debtors. Married individuals may file for bankruptcy jointly. See 11
U.S.C. § 302. Debtors may also file under Chapter 13 frequently, perhaps more than once a
year, in order to delay foreclosure or other creditor remedies. See. e.g., Warren, supra note
14, at 502-0S (discussing strategic refining by Chapter 13 debtors).
95
 An alternative answer is suggested by the literature on public assistance which faces
a similar issue in that only a small fraction of citizens receive this assistance. See Statistical
Abstract, supra note 94, at 380 (indicating that of about 71 million families surveyed in
1998, about 2.6 million received some form of public assistance during 1997). Partly as a
consequence, many economists focus on the altruistic goals that these programs may serve
by ensuring that citizens do not fall below some minimal standard of living. See, Besley
& Coate, supra note 19, at 187. Bankruptcy may play a similar role and may do so at less
cost to the public fist because the debtors themselves bear the cost of the protection in the
form of higher interest rates and reduced access to credit. As discussed above, however,
one needs stronger assumptions to predict the bankruptcy system that the altruist would
choose. See supra note 72. Moreover, bankruptcy does not appear to be just about concern
for the destitute. Studies of debtors in bankruptcy reveal that they resemble society as a
whole. See SULLIVAN rr Al,., Supra note 5, at 328; SULLIVAN ET Al,., SUM !Kite 4, at 6.
96 See. e.g., Robert M. Townsend, Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly
State Verification, 211 ECON. THEORY 265, 265 (1979).
97 Sec id.
98 See, e.g., Douglas Gale & Martin 1 iellwig, Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-
Period Problem, 52 REV. of EcoN. Snit). 647, 648 (1985). Many of the results of this "optimal
contracts" literature depend on very strong assumptions. The fundamental observation
that information itself is costly, however, may have important implications for the structure
of collections law. In particular, society may rationally choose to forego information in
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When the court does inquire as to debtors' circumstances, however,
the court should fully insure debtors so that they always consume the
same amount after this investigation." Therefore, subject to compet-
ing goals, bankruptcy should try to ensure that a debtor consumes the
same amount regardless of the severity of loss that led to bank-
ruptcy. 100
A. Utopian Bankruptcy
If judges were omniscient and could identify the grasshoppers
and opossums, they could implement a utopian bankruptcy system
that, like the first-best tax, provides debtors with full insurance against
adverse events and does not lead to any inefficiency."' To avoid the
grasshopper problem, this utopian bankruptcy system would deny re-
lief when debtors' financial distress resulted from their own misbehav-
ior. For those debtors deserving of relief, the utopian bankruptcy sys-
tem would reduce their debt to a new amount based on their ability to
repay, thus eliminating the opossum problem.
1. Guarding the Gates of Bankruptcy: Identifying the Grasshoppers
A utopian bankruptcy system would insure debtors against mis-
fortune without encouraging them to borrow an excessive amount or
to misbehave in other ways that make financial distress too likely. An
omniscient judge could achieve this goal by always granting relief for
financial distress resulting from misfortune and never granting relief
for financial distress resulting from misbehavior. 102
Unfortunately, this guideline may prove of little practical use be-
cause often both misbehavior and misfortune will jointly cause
some circumstances and rely on other forms of verification such as punishment. See, e.g.,
Kelly D. Welch, From Debtor's Prison to Bankruptcy: The Enforcement of Optimal Debt
Contracts 8 (Feb. 2001) (unpublished paper, on file with author). This Article, however,
seeks to describe the bankruptcy system that society should choose given that the judge has
collected all available information.
99 Sec Gate Hellwig, supra note 98, at 661.
10° As discussed above, a court may wish to simply forgive all of the debts of all debtors
who have no ability to pay. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
101 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
102 See Karen Gross, Preserving a Fresh Start for the Individual Debtor: The Case for Narrow
Construction of the Consumer Credit Amendments, 135 U. PA. L. KEY. 59, 148 (1986) (arguing
for this approach for modifications of bankruptcy plans).
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financial distress. 03
 For example, a temporary period of unemploy-
ment might not lead to bankruptcy unless the debtor has failed to
save a sufficient. amount to withstand a temporary loss of income.'"
Moreover, a firm may fire a worker in part because of an economic
downturn and in part because the worker was not quite as diligent as
his co-workers who were retained.
Still, the utopian bankruptcy system can accommodate these
mixed-cause shocks as well by focusing on the reasonableness of the
debtor's choices. Just as the first-best. tax assesses an arbitrarily large
amount. against those taxpayers who do not invest sufficiently in their
future, the utopian bankruptcy system denies relief for these mixed-
cause shocks to those debtors who borrow an excessive amount or
who otherwise take actions that unreasonably increase the probability
of financial distress, Effectively, utopian bankruptcy denies relief to
the negligent. 105
 Because debtors realize that they will not receive re-
lief if they are negligent, they will only borrow an appropriate amount
and take the proper care to avoid financial distress.
2. Projected and Potential Income: How Much Can the Opossum
Pay?
The utopian bankruptcy system, like the first-best tax or transfer
system, provides individuals with no more relief than they need. In
addition, just as the first-best public assistance program gives recipi-
ents a lump-sum transfer based on their need and the first-best tax
system assesses a lump-sum amount based on taxpayers' ability to
pay, 10
 the utopian bankruptcy system leaves debtors with a lump-sum
obligation based on their ability to pay. A debt obligation is a lump-
sum when the amount debtors must pay does not vary with their ac-
tual income. 107
 Therefore, the utopian bankruptcy system merely ad-
justs debtors' obligations to a new (lower) level consistent with their
ability to pay. That is, in the utopian bankruptcy system the judge pro-
jects how much the debtor would earn if the debtor worked the
See, e.g., Warren, supra note 13, at 1081 (describing usability of consumers to with-
stand shocks, such as divorce or unemployment, due to debt obligations they have in-
curred).
2 ° 4 See id.
10 ' The debtors' negligence stems from the fact that their borrowing increases the
probability of default by an unreasonable amount.
106
	 supra notes 20,48 and accompanying text,
107 See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
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efficient amount and decides how much that debtor should retain for
consumption. 108
For example, assmne that an omniscient judge determines that if
the debtor could have specified the amount in advance, he would
have chosen to consume $3,000 per month in bankruptcy. If the om-
-niscient judge determines that the debtor still has a relatively high
earnings ability and thus could earn $7,000 per month if he worked as
many hours as he should, then the judge would require the debtor to
pay $4,000 per month. If the judge determines that the debtor has
suffered a setback that leaves the debtor only able to earn $4,000 per
month if he works as many hours as he should, then the judge would
require the debtor to pay only $1,000 per month. The debtor's new
obligations equal the amount by which his projected income exceeds
the amount that the judge determines the debtor should consurne.m
Because the debtor's new obligations are set with regard to his pro-
jected or potential income, the debtor retains the last dollar of his
actual income and therefore he will work the efficient amount that
the omniscient judge predicted. 110
The optimal tax literature generally focuses on the number of
hours that a debtor works, but the analysis can readily be applied to
other questions as well. Perhaps because the issue strikes so close to
home, law professors ask how much a debtor should be required to
repay if he chooses an occupation that offers more attractive non-
pecuniary benefits over one that offers a higher salary."' For exam-
ple, assume that an individual can choose to work in private practice
at a salary of approximately $200,000 a year or in academia at a salary
of approximately $100,000 a year. According to the logic of optimal
taxation, even though the debtor would earn double the monetary
income by working in private practice, he should still pay the same
amount that he would have paid had he worked in academia." 2 If the
amount that debtors must repay depends on their choice of occupa-
I" See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
109 See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
110 This follows from precisely the same logic as used in the optimal tax context. See su-
pra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
HI See jAcKsort, supra note 8, at 246-47; Gross, supra note 102, at 136-38.
115 See jAcKsoN, supra note 8, at 246-47 (arguing that if debtors are asked to pay more
when their earnings are higher, they may choose jobs with more non-pecuniary benefits
such as teaching). But see Gross, supra note 102, at 13fi-38 (arguing that the repayment
required in Chapter 13 of'the Bankruptcy Code should not be conditioned on what the
debtor could earn because this would reduce the debtor's ability to choose alternative
occupations and would therefore reduce the voluntary nature of bankruptcy).
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Lion, bankruptcy may distort their choices and debtors may choose to
work as professors even if they would have preferred the added com-
pensation of private practice to the non-pecuniary benefits of acade-
mia.
To say that a fixed repayment does not distort a debtor's choice
does not mean that it will not affect the debtor's choice. A law profes-
sor, who under normal circumstances would find the compensation
more than adequate, may be forced to work in the private sector if
required to pay too much to her creditors. Because of this, Professor
Gross suggests that the repayment amount should be set with regard
to the debtor's occupation at the time of filing so as to preserve the
debtor's freedom of choice. 11 s A large required repayment, however,
only forces the professor into private practice by affecting her wealth,
or lack thereof. Clearly one of the benefits of wealth is that it affords
an individual greater choices, and a lower repayment increases the
debtor's wealth. This is also true of any other transfer of wealth, how-
ever, and one still needs a method for determining whether the
debtor or her creditors are entitled to this wealth.
In a utopian bankruptCy system, the judge would allow the debtor
to keep as much wealth as the debtor would have included in a hypo-
thetical contract chosen at the time of borrowing from behind the veil
of ignorance as to the debtor's actual future condition.'" Note that
this does not necessarily mean that debtors must always earn as much
as they possibly can. It is easier to understand this point if one first
focuses on the question of how many hours debtors should work.
Debtors would not agree to a contract that. could force them to work
twenty-four hours a clay, seven clays a week; all debtors would gladly
pay a slightly higher interest rate in exchange for some leisure. Like-
wise, at least some debtors would contract in advance for the right to
work in a position that. does not yield the highest pecuniary earnings
available because they would find the more remunerative alternative
occupation intolerable. Whereas in practice it may be extremely
difficult to determine what position the debtor would have chosen, in
a utopian world an omniscient judge could accomplish this task.
Therefore, the omniscient judge would base the debtor's required
repayment on the occupation the debtor would have agreed to
choose in the event of default. The judge, however, will require the
113 See Gross, supra note 102, at 130-40.
114
 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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debtor to repay the same amount regardless of the occupation that
the debtor actually chooses.
3. Accounting for Subsequent Shocks
If a judge were truly omniscient and could predict the future, the
debtor would never experience an unexpected shock. One might,
however, instead adopt a weaker definition of an all-knowing judge
and assume that although he can observe the debtor's innate earn-
ings ability, he cannot necessarily predict whether the debtor will ex-
perience the same unfortunate shocks that justify bankruptcy: unem-
ployment, illness, divorce, etc." 5 If the judge cannot predict future
shocks, a bankruptcy system that merely provides the debtor with a
new, albeit reduced, debt obligation and no prospect of further relief
cannot be optimal. Although such a system may provide the debtor
with the appropriate incentives to work hard after filing for bank-
ruptcy, it provides no insurance against future misfortune. Therefore,
the utopian bankruptcy system must allow for repetitive bankruptcy
filings or modifications of the debts created by the original bank-
ruptcy filing.
The prospect •of further distress replicates the justification for
bankruptcy but also replicates the grasshopper problem; this further
distress may arise either from misfortune or from misbehavior. An
omniscient judge can apply the same solutions that are used to solve
the grasshopper problem created by the existence of bankruptcy re-
lief. 116 Just as before, if the debtor's future losses are always caused
entirely by misbehavior or entirely by misfortune, an omniscient judge
would simply deny any further relief in the former case and always
grant full relief in the latter." 7 In the more realistic scenario in which
losses are often caused by both misfortune and misbehavior, the om-
niscient judge would again focus on whether the debtor took
115 Numerous articles in the optimal taxation literature have taken this approach and
demonstrate that a lump-sum tax is not necessarily optimal. See, e.g., P.A. Diamond et al.,
Optimal Taxation in a Stochastic Economy, 14 J. Pun. ECON. 1, 6-7 (1980); Jonathan Eaton &
Harvey S. Rosen, Labor Supply, Uncertainty, and Efficient Taxation, 14 J. Putt. Ecom. 365, 365-
66 (1980); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Self-Selection and Parew Efficient Taxation, 17 J. Puts. ECON. 213,
213 (1982); Hal R. Varian, Redistributive Taxation as Social Insurance, 14 J. Pun. ECON. 49, 66
(1980). The primary purpose of these articles, however, is to accomplish what the standard
optimal tax literature largely failed to do: justify progressive marginal income tax rates.
115 See supra Part II.A.1.
117 See Gross, supra note 102, at 148 (arguing for this approach for modifications of
bankruptcy plans).
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sufficient care to avoid future losses and deny relief to those that (lid
not.
B. Second-Best Bankruptcy and the Centrality of Information_
In the utopian bankruptcy system, an omniscient judge solves the
grasshopper and opossum problems by identifying and punishing
those who misbehave. In the real world, judges are not omniscient.
Because of this, and because some individuals may be unable to con-
trol their behavior, society may not want to punish all of the grass-
hoppers. Society, however, does need some method of catching the
opossums. How the judge should search for the opossums among us
depends on the information that she has at her disposal. A pessimist
would assume that judges cannot observe any relevant facts about the
debtor except his actual income and that he is indebted. 118 Under this
view the second-best bankruptcy system looks very much like the sec-
ond-best tax; it is effectively an income tax. The guarded optimist
would assume that although judges are not omniscient, they can
sometimes provide a workable estimate of a debtor's potential in-
come, for example, by using the debtor's past income, level of educa-
tion, or some other observable predictor. Under this view, the second-
best. bankruptcy system invokes some of the features of the utopian
bankruptcy system, but with some adjustments for the limitations of
judicial ability.
I. Catching the Grasshoppers: Barring the Willful but Not. the
Negligent
The above description of the second-best public assistance pro-
gram assumed that the government could not determine if an indi-
118
 The extreme pessimist might even reject the assumption that the judge may ob-
serve the debtor's actual income. To some extent this is undoubtedly true. judges cannot
effectively value some forms of economic income, such as the work product of a spouse
that stays home to raise the family's children. But this problem is not unique to bankruptcy
law; it is a frequent topic among tax scholars. See, e.g., Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing HOUSC1001*,
84 GEo. 141571,1577-79 (1996). A more severe pessimist would assert that judges just do
not have the resources to observe a bankrupt debtor's actual income after filing. If this is
the case, the only method of solving the opossum problem is to punish those who seek
relief; those who "can" pay will pay in order to avoid the punishment. Sec Rea, supra note 7,
at 195. Perhaps this is a plausible description of Chapter 7, which appears to rely heavily on
the threat of a damaged credit reputation to discourage debtors front filing. The use of
punishment in a bankruptcy system is left to a future article as it leaves little role for a
bankruptcy judge.
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vidual took the appropriate steps to avoid her current state of need.' 9
This assumption probably understates the government's ability. For
example, one might believe that the government can identify those
individuals who left school early without a good justification or those
workers that were fired due to shoddy attendance at work. Neverthe-
less, public assistance programs generally will not deny relief on these
grounds or similar findings that an individual's distress resulted from
her own negligent behavior. 120 Perhaps this refusal to deny relief to
the negligent. is an unfortunate result of a "Samaritan's dilemina;" 121
altruists cannot credibly commit to denying relief to those that mis-
behave because the altruists would be unable to live with the resulting
suffering.
Private insurance contracts, however, generally take the same ap-
proach as public insurance programs. 122 Private insurance contracts,
like public assistance or bankruptcy, create a grasshopper problem
because the insured is insulated from the full consequences of her
actions that increase the probability or extent of loss. 123 A property
owner protected by fire insurance may be less inclined to buy a sprin-
kler system. A law student whose laptop is insured through a home-
owner's policy may take fewer precautions against theft. A motorist
fully insured against liability may drive more carelessly.
If insurers can observe undesirable behavior before any harm
results, they can adjust their premiums accordingly. If the insurer can
do so perfectly, the insured will once again bear the full costs of their
behavior and they will choose the efficient level of care: 124 there will
be no grasshopper problem. For example, motorists have a strong in-
centive to drive at a safe speed because their insurance rates will in-
crease if they receive a speeding ticket. As a practical matter, however,
the insurer cannot continuously monitor all of the insured's behavior,
and thus this approach cannot completely solve the grasshopper
problem.
110 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
120 See, e.g., ROTHSTEIN ET AL, supra note 59, at 771 ("Mere inadvertence or inauen-
don [that led to termination] will normally be insufficient to disqualify unemployment
claimants. There must be evidence of intentional misconduct.").
121 See, e.g., Stephen Coate, Altruism, the Samaritan's Dilemma, and Government Transfer
Policy, 85 Am. EcoN. REV, 46, 46 (1995).
122 See, e.g., POLINSKY, supra note 74, at 56.
I" See id.
124 See id. at 56-57; STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 211
(1987); Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL
L. REV. 313, 337 (1990).
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Alternatively, insurers could just exclude coverage for a loss if
they discover that. the insured failed to take sufficient care and was
therefore negligent. As long as the insurer sets the standard of care
correctly, the insured would then always maintain the proper level of
care for fear that if he took less care he would receive no insurance at
all. This is the same principle as the tort law's use of a negligence the-
ory of liability) 25 Thus, there would be no reason for the debtor to
buy insurance against liability based solely on negligence as it would
always be cheaper to take the efficient. level of care than to buy insur-
ance against the loss)"
At least. from the beginning of the twentieth century, however,
individuals have been able to purchase insurance against the conse-
quences of their own negligence) 27 and today such insurance is
common. Property insurance protects the insured against accidental
loss) 28
 Fire insurance will pay a claim even if the insured negligently
started the fire) 29 In addition, individuals buy insurance against liabil-
ity based on negligence principles. Individuals buy homeowner's in-
surance policies that include protections against liability that. gener-
ally requires a finding of negligence)" Today, many states effectively
require motorists to buy insurance against the liability that results from
their own negligence)" and many motorists voluntarily buy insurance
that far exceeds the minimum amount required by statute.
Scholars advance two primary arguments for why the market of-
fers insurance against negligent behavior; both are based on human
imperfections. First, an individual might buy insurance based on the
belief that the risk of liability cannot be avoided by taking the proper
level of care, A system that denies relief due to negligent behavior re-
t25 see, e.g., SHAVE:IL, SUM note 124, at 8.
120 See, e.g., id. at 212.
127
 See. e.g.. Breeden v. Frankfort Marine, Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 119 S.W. 576,
576 (Mo. 1909).
125 See ROBERT E. KmroN & ALAN I, WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMEN-
TAL Patmcwi,Es, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL. PRACTICES 497 (1988). Some
courts, however, have suggested in dicta that grossly negligent or reckless conduct could
bar recovery. Sec id. at 539-41,
129 Sec id. at 492. Some courts, however, have suggested in dicta that grossly negligent
or reckless conduct could bar recovery. Id. at 492-93.
150
 Sec Schwartz, supra note 124, at 344. Homeowner's insurance policies also protect
the homeowner against other risks as well.
131
 See, e.g., PacuARn A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 221 (5th ed. 1998)
("Automobile liability insurance is now almost universal, although this is partly because
states required drivers to buy liability insurance or present equivalent evidence of financial
responsibility for accidents.").
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lies on judges and juries to make difficult decisions about whether the
individual took the proper level of care, and the trier of fact may
sometimes incorrectly deny relief. 132 Second, and more controver-
sially, individuals might buy insurance based on the belief that they .
can't always maintain the proper level of care. 1" To understand the
distinction between these two explanations, consider why drivers buy
more than the minimum required liability insurance. The demand for
insurance stems at least in part from the fear that a jury would
wrongly find that the driver negligently caused an accident. The de-
mand, however, may also stem from the fear that the driver may be-
come momentarily distracted by his child and fail to see a red light.
The insurer who issues a policy that. protects the insured against
his own negligence must charge higher premiums to account for the
increased chance that the insured will suffer a loss and file a claim. In
order to mitigate this grasshopper problem, and thus pay lower pre-
miums, the insured agrees to face some of the consequences of his
negligence; the insured only buys partial insurance. 154 For example,
private insurance contracts often require the insured to pay a de-
ductible to cover part of any loss."5 In addition, the insurance policy
may not cover all of the harms that are likely to result from the in-
sured's negligence. Some forms of automobile liability insurance de-
cline to cover the damage to the negligent motorist's own vehicle.
Health insurance will not pay the insured for the pain of the insured's
illness. Finally, the fact that the insured will need insurance in the fu-
ture also gives the insured an incentive to take care. For example, a
motorist found to have negligently caused an accident will pay higher
insurance premiums in the future. if the insured has too many acci-
dents, the insured may be unable to buy insurance altogether.
If one views bankruptcy as just another form of insurance, then
one might reject the utopian goal of denying relief to negligent debt-
ors. Although bankruptcy judges may be wise, they are clearly not
omniscient and therefore will make errors. For example, to the extent
that many bankrupt debtors borrowed too much to allow them to
withstand a financial shock such as unemployment or divorce," 6
bankruptcy judge would be forced to rule on whether a debtor's bor-
rowing choices were reasonable in light of the debtor's financial pros-
1t2 See SHAVELL., supra note 124, at 212; Schwartz, supra note 124, at 344-45.
"5 See Schwartz, supra note 124, at 347.
14 See, e.g., POLINSKY, Supra note 74, at 57.
"5 See it!.
06 See, e.g., Warren, supra note 13, at 1084.
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pests. A judge viewing the debtor's decision with the benefit of hind-
sight. may incorrectly rule against the debtor.
In some cases, however, debtors will have clearly spent their way
into bankruptcy, leaving little room for judicial error. Nevertheless,
the second-best bankruptcy system may grant relief to the spendthrift.
if society believes that some debtors are just unable to resist the temp-
tation of easy credit. Certainly there is support for this theory in the
literature. Professor Jackson argues that the need for bankruptcy is
largely based on cognitive and volitional failures among debtors that.
prevent. them from making the right credit decisions. 137 Others argue
that society should encourage creditors to restrict access to credit,
presumably because debtors are unable to determine when borrowing
is in their self-in terest. 138
This does not mean that the second-best bankruptcy system ig-
nores the grasshopper problem. But because this system cannot dis-
tinguish between the grasshoppers and the truly unfortunate, society
must make bankruptcy less attractive so that individuals have some
incentive to avoid financial clistress. 139 The repeat nature of credit.
markets, like the repeat nature of insurance markets, will provide
some help. Just as the insured takes care to avoid the increased pre-
miums that. follow an accident, the debtor will take care to avoid the
increased interest rates and loss of credit that follow bankruptcy.
The threat of reduced access to credit, however, is only a partial
solution, and just as insurance contracts require the payment of de-
ductibles and insure only part of the debtor's loss, the second-best
bankruptcy must also offer only partial insurance. That is, the second-
best bankruptcy system must be less generous than the utopian bank-
ruptcy system so that debtors will face some of the consequences of
actions that make financial distress more likely. Exactly how much re-
lief the second-best bankruptcy system should provide is a matter of
compromise. In the private insurance context, society does not need
to worry about the correct. level of partial insurance so long as the in-
surance contract has no negative effects on third parties; 14° the in-
sured and the insurer will agree to the most mutually beneficial terms.
137
 Seeincxsom, supra note 8, at 232-41.
133 See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 13, at 6-8.
133
 By making bankruptcy less generous, society forces debtors to bear more of the
costs of their financial failure and thus provides debtors with an incentive to avoid
financial distress.
140 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 124, at 351 (discussing the under-compensation of vic-
tims in the tort system).
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Unfortunately, the optimal bankruptcy system, like the optimal tax
and public assistance programs, is only part of a hypothetical contract,
and therefore the correct level of partial insurance is debatable) ."
So far, this Article has treated the grasshopper problem as a func-
tion of negligence. Financial distress, however, results from far more
culpable conduct as well. At the other extreme, the debtor may face a
judgment for a willful tort such as sexual assault. Here the analogy to
private insurance again provides some guidance.
While private insurance contracts protect debtors from the con-
sequences of their own negligence, these contracts do not protect
debtors from the consequences of their own willful misconduct. Pri-
vate insurance contracts almost always contain some clause excluding
liability for intentional acts." 2 Even in the absence of such a clause,
courts will often find an implied exception for intentional conduct," 5
and a contract that purported to insure an individual against willful
misconduct would likely be held void as against public policy." 4
Therefore, if a homeowner intentionally sets fire to his house, fire in-
surance will not reimburse him." 5 If a motorist intentionally hits a
pedestrian, automobile insurance would not pay for the damages that
would reside -16 and would certainly not prevent the driver from serv-
ing time in prison.
Public insurance programs often take this same approach. For
example, unemployment insurance will deny benefits if the unem-
ployed has engaged in willful misconduct such as a work-related fel-
141 See, e.g., Adler et al., supra note 13, at 608-09 (discussing trade-off between the gen-
erous treatment of a debtor in bankruptcy and the effect that this generosity has on the
debtor's incentives to avoid financial distress).
142 See KEETON & WMISS, supra note 128, at 498 ("Insurance policies typically include
express provisions which either require that a loss be accidental or preclude coverage for
intended results."); Willy E. Rice, Insurance Contracts and Judicial Discord over Whether Liability
Insurers Must Defend Insureds' Allegedly Intentional and Immoral Conduct: A Historical and Em-
pirical Review of Federal and State Courts' DeclaratoryJudgments-1900-1997, 47 Am. U. L. MN.
1131, 1145-46 (1998) (describing the main components and clauses of a third-party liabil-
ity insurance contract); D. Heath Rally, Note, Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. Harrington: Resist-
ing the Impulse to Judicially Rewrite Exclusion Clauses, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1645, 1645-46 (1998)
(stating that insurance companies protect themselves through the use of an intentional
acts exclusion clause).
143 See KEETor,1	 WIDIss, supra note 128, at 498 ("Thus, as discussed in the preceding
section, courts frequently have held that even in the absence of express provisions, insur-
ance contracts only provide coverage for accidental losses.").
144 Sce, e.g., id. at 519 (citing Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes, 388 A,2(1 603, 606 (N.J.
1978)).
"3 Id. at 516.
146
 Sec id. at 518.
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ony or misdemeanor. 147 Therefore, one might conclude that bank-
ruptcy should deny relief for willful misconduct as well. This assump-
tion, however, is discussed more fully below.'"
2. Catching the Opossums: The Pessimist and the Guarded Optimist
The utopian bankruptcy system assumes that the judge can per-
fectly estimate a debtor's earnings ability or potential earnings. To the
extent. that, one rejects this assumption, one rejects the feasibility of a
bankruptcy system based on debt-adjustment just as economists gen-
erally reject the feasibility of a progressive lump-sum tax. 149
 If a judge
cannot distinguish the high-ability debtors from the low-ability debt-
ors, a debt-adjustment system must leave all debtors with the same
amount. of debt or else those with a high-ability will just "play 'pos-
sum" and claim that they cannot repay anything.'" Such a scheme
would fail to meet the insurance goals assumed to underlie bank-
ruptcy'. Therefore, one must search for a feasible second-best ap-
proach. What one considers feasible depends on one's assumptions
about the actual ability of judges to identify the opossums among us.
a, The Pessimist and Income Taxes
Even though pessimists would reject the assumption that judges
can observe a debtor's potential earnings, they would likely concede
that the bankruptcy judge can observe the debtor's actual earnings
after die bankruptcy filing. This is essentially the same assumption
that underlies the analysis of the second-best tax, 15 ' and a similar re-
sult follows. According to the pessimist, the second-best bankruptcy
147 See, e.g,RolltsTEIN F...r
	 50/77 note 59, at 771.
148 See inftri notes 246-288 and accompanying text.
148
 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
159
 This statement ignores the use of punishment to separate those debtors who can
pay from those who cannot. By punishing the debtor when he defaults, one can again im-
plement a system that provides some relief for the destitute debtor. See, e.g., Rea, sepia note
7, at 193. Punishment may play a large role in bankruptcy. For example. the threat of the
loss of a debtor's credit reputation may deter those debtors who can repay from filing for
bankruptcy. This use of punishment is only appropriate in the absence of information. Sec
Welch, supra note 98, at 1-2. It is entirely possible that the size of bankruptcy judges' dock-
ets prevents them, or even bankruptcy trustees, from inquiring as to the specific circum-
stances of most debtors, and therefore a punishment—based system is needed. This Article.
however, focuses on the question of how judges should act if they had at least some infor-
mation about a debtor's ability to pay. Moreover, this reliance on punishment assumes that
judges effectively play no role in the bankruptcy process. Therefore, this Article leaves the
role of punishment in bankruptcy to future work.
151 See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
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system would increase the debtor's required repayment as the
debtor's actual income increased; the second-best bankruptcy system
would effectively include an income tax. 152 This system allows some
limited relief because the high-ability debtor would need to earn, and
therefore consume, very little in order to "play 'possum" by emulating
the low-ability, individual. The precise characteristics of this effective
income tax, like the precise characteristics of the second-best income
tax, balance the individual's need for insurance against the unfortu-
nate consequences that income taxes have on an individual's desire to
work.'"
b. The Guarded Optimist and Subsequent Modifications
A guarded optimist would believe that the pessimist understates
the ability of judges to estimate a debtor's potential income. Some
debtors will work in occupations that. yield a fairly regular or stable
stream of income over a number of years, and the income history of
these debtors, along with other observable characteristics such as level
of education, may provide a fairly good basis for estimating their po-
tential earnings. The judge, however, can never perfectly estimate fu-
ture or potential earnings; the size of a debtor's bonus or the number
of overtime hours available to him may change from year to year.
More seriously, the debtor may lose his job or may earn a promotion
or a substantial raise.
Because the guarded optimist assumes a level of information
greater than that underlying the pessimist's view of the second-best.
bankruptcy system and yet less than that needed to implement the
utopian bankruptcy system, the guarded optimist would choose a
bankruptcy system that blends the two approaches. Recall that the
utopian bankruptcy system bases debtors' required repayment solely
on their potential income and that the pessimist's second-best bank-
ruptcy bases debtors' required repayment solely on their actual in-
"2 See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
153 The analysis of the proper rates for this effective income tax is a little more compli-
cated than in the tax analysis and more closely resembles the analysis of the effective rates
that should be included in second-best public assistance programs. That is, one must con-
sider not only the effect that the effective tax has on the work incentives of those receiving
relief but also on the work incentives of those not receiving relief. Because lower effective
tax rates may encourage some individuals to work a little less in order to begin receiving
relief, one cannot even conclude that an effective tax rate of 100% discourages work in the
aggregate. Sec infra note 406 and accompanying text.
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come. 15" An intermediate approach would base the debtor's required
repayment on the judge's estimate of the debtor's potential income,
but then allow for further modifications if the debtor's actual income
deviated sharply from this estimate. If judges never modify the initial
obligation, this is just the utopian bankruptcy system as the required
repayment is based solely on the debtor's projected earnings. 155 If
judges always modify the obligation when the debtor's actual income
deviated from the estimate, this is just the pessimist's bankruptcy sys-
tem as the required repayment is based solely on the debtor's actual
earnings. 156
Recall that if judges are not truly omniscient in that they cannot
perfectly predict the future, the utopian bankruptcy system includes
modifications or subsequent bankruptcies to account for unexpected
shocks. 157
 The utopian system would always adjust debtors' required
repayment when the change in their circumstances was entirely due
to fate and never adjust debtors' required repayment when the debt-
ors themselves caused the change or when the debtors failed to work
hard enough to avoid the ensuing financial difficulties.'" That is, the
utopian bankruptcy system adopts the same negligence standard to
solve the grasshopper problem in the context of modifications that. it
adopts to solve the grasshopper problem in general.'"
The guarded optimist, however, does not advocate the strict use
of a negligence standard in bankruptcy and would not advocate for its
use in the modification context either. Just as judges may be unable to
determine whether debtors' negligent misbehavior resulted in their
initial financial distress, they may be unable to determine if the debt-
ors' misbehavior led to the need for further relief.
Recognizing the limited ability of a judge to determine if the
change in the debtor's circumstances resulted from fate or the
debtor's own efforts, or lack thereof, the guarded optimist might ad-
vocate a system that modifies a debtor's required repayment only after
a substantial change in the debtor's circumstances. Many small
changes in a debtor's income, such as the income resulting from a few
extra hours of overtime or a slightly larger bonus, are probably the
direct result of the debtor's own efforts. Bankruptcy should not mod-
154 Sec supra notes 20,62 and accompanying text.
155 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
156 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
157
 Sec supra notes 115-117 and accompanying text.
158
 Sec supra notes 115-117 and accompanying text.
759 Sec supra notes 115-117 and accompanying text.
36	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 44:1
ify a debtor's required repayment in response to these changes so that.
the debtor retains the incentive to work hard.m Of course, some
small changes in financial condition, such as costs associated with a
broken small appliance, are the result of chance and therefore, ide-
ally, should be insured. Nevertheless, by definition these changes are
small and therefore the debtor has little need for the insurance.
By contrast, larger changes in a debtor's financial condition may
involve a greater element of chance. Workers may to a large extent.
earn promotions, raises, or large bonuses. Their success, however, also
depends on the efforts of their co-workers and the overall success of
their firm. Likewise, workers who shirk are more likely to be fired.
Nevertheless, macroeconomic forces clearly play a role as is evidenced
by the cyclical nature of unemployment. 161
The claim that larger changes in the debtor's financial condition
are more likely to result from chance than are small changes is an
empirical assertion and no proof is offered. But even if this assertion
is incorrect, one might still prefer a system that only modifies the
debtor's obligations following a large change in the debtor's circum-
stances. These large changes will occur only infrequently and involve
large sums of money. Therefore, it will be cost effective for a judge to
at least conduct an inquiry as to whether the change was caused by
fate or the debtor's own efforts and perhaps judges are correct just.
often enough to make such an inquiry worthwhile. 162
160 This effect is probably even more dramatic if one focuses on a debtor's disposable
income, or income net of expenses. If bankruptcy adjusted for any small change in the
debtor's income after expenses, the debtor would have no incentive to live more frugally.
161 For example, in 1992 the unemployment rate was at or above 7.3% each month. See
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Labor Force Statistics from the Current
Population Survey. available at http://data.bls.govicgi-bin/surveymost (last visited Sept. 9,
2002). In 2000, the tin etnployment rate was at or below 4.1% each month. Id.
162 The family law context provides an interesting analogy. Most states set child support
payments equal to the percentage of the parent's income that the child would have re-
ceived had the family remained together. Barbara R. Rowe & Kay W. Hansen, Child Support
Awards in Utah: Have Guidelines Made a Difference?, 21 j. CONTENIP, L. 195, 200 (1995). This
"income share" model, however, does not require a change in child support payments
from month to month as the parent's income changes. Rather the court sets a fixed dollar
obligation based on the parent's income at the time of the hearing. See generally NAT 1.
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, A SUMMARY OF CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES H (1990). The
parties can seek a modification of the child support obligations, but unless a substantial
amount of time has elapsed (often about three years), the moving party usually must show
that the amount awarded would change by at least 10%. See id. at 17.
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III. USING THE OPTIMAL BANKRUPTCY ANALYSIS TO INTERPRET THE
CURRENT BANKRUPTCY CODE
Part II described the optimal bankruptcy procedure in the ab-
stract. This Article seeks, however, to offer guidance to real judges
who must. interpret. an
 existing Bankruptcy Code. Using the analysis
of Part. II as a guide, this Part argues that courts should interpret the
existing Bankruptcy Code in a way that. accounts for the moral haz-
ards created by the bankruptcy system. Most courts have already
shown a great willingness to improvise when interpreting an
imperfect code, and a few have even been willing to ignore the plain
meaning of the text of the code. 163
 In many cases, however, the
language of the code is either ambiguous or expressly invites
bankruptcy judges to use their discretion to account for debtor
misbehavior. In such circumstances, courts could address many of the
opossum and grasshopper problems identified in this Article while
still remaining fairly faithful to the text of the code.
Since this Article discusses how courts should interpret specific
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, Part. III-A provides a brief intro-
duction to collections law that. will place these provisions in the
proper context.. Part. discusses how courts should address the
grasshopper problem, and Part III-C discusses how they should ad-
chess the opossum problem.
A. A Thief Description of Coiled ions Law
A complex web of state and federal laws regulate collections in
modern America. Most consumers who fail to repay their debts
probably do not file for bankruptcy.I 64 Instead, they rely on state and
federal non-bankruptcy laws to protect them from their creditors. 1 °5
For example, federal law limits the manner in which a collections
105
 See infra note 328 and accompanying text.
10+ See, e.g., AM. BANKERS ASSN, 1997 INSTALLMENT CREDIT SURVEY REPORT 109 (9th
ed. 1997) (reporting that approximately 70% of all bank consumer credit losses occur
outside of bankruptcy). Of course, this is a percentage of the dollar amount of outstanding
obligations rather than individuals, and it is possible that some individuals might file for
bankruptcy long after their creditors accounted for their debt as unlikely to be repaid.
This figure, however, clearly implies that a large number of debtors who refuse to repay
their loans do not file for bankruptcy. See id.
165
 Americans also have a long tradition of simply hiding from their creditors, a tradi-
tion that continues today. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One
Code, Mali},
 Cultures, 67 AM, BANKR. L , l. 501, 524 (1993) (noting that lawyers sometimes
advise their clients to evade their creditors by moving or changing their telephone num-
bers).
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agency may contact a debtorma and limits the amount of a debtor's
wages that creditors can garnish to no more than 25% of the debtor's
after-tax income. 167 Some state laws restrict garnishment even further
or prohibit it altogether) 68 Both state and federal laws also limit the
amount and type of physical property that the sheriff can seize to sat-
isfy a creditor's clairn. 169 Though property exemption laws vary con-
siderably from state to state, 170 they usually offer at least some protec-
tion to debtors for certain types of assets such as their homes, 171 their
cars, 172 and their tools."3 Any theory of bankruptcy must consider the
existence of these non-bankruptcy laws.
While non-bankruptcy collections law remains extremely impor-
tant, scholars now focus more heavily on bankruptcy." 4 As a practical
matter, there are two forms of consumer bankruptcy: a Chapter 7 liq-
uidation and a Chapter 13 adjustment of debts. 175 A substantial major-
ity of bankrupt Americans choose a liquidation under Chapter 7. 176
Chapter 7 provides debtors with a full discharge of most unsecured
debts,"7 thereby absolving debtors of the need to repay out of their
166 Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (2400).
167 Id. §§ 1672-1673 (restricting garnishment in favor of general creditors to no more
than the lesser of 25% of debtors' disposable earnings or the amount by which their dis-
posable earnings exceeds thirty times the federal minimum wage. "Disposable earnings" is
defined in this context to mean roughly the debtor's take-home pay).
168 See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001 (b) (1) (Vernon 2002) (exempting current
wages for personal services).
169 See infra notes 170-173 and accompanying text.
1" See, e,g., Eric A. Posner et al., The Political Economy of Property Exemption Laws 5-
6 (Sept. 19, 2001) (working paper, on file with the author) (describing property exemp-
tion laws).
171 See, e.g., CAL. Ctv. Pram:. CODE § 704.730 (West Stipp. 2002) (allowing homestead
exemptions between $50,000 and $125,000, depending on household composition).
172 See, e.g., id. § 704.010 (providing a $1,900 exemption of equity in a motor vehicle).
173 See, e.g., id. § 704.060 (providing a $5,000 exemption for tools).
174 For example, in one of the leading casebooks on debtor-creditor law only approxi-
mately 157 of 1043 pages are devoted to non-bankruptcy collections. See WARREN
OROOK, supra note 86, at 3-1043.
175 Individual debtors may also file under Chapter 11. In 2000, however, only 686 of
over 1,217,000 non-business bankruptcy filings (less than .05 of 1%) were filed under
Chapter 11. See Am. Bankr. Inst., Non-Business Bankruptcy Filings by Chapter, 1990-2001,
per Quarter, available at lutp://xww.abiworld.org/stats/1990nonbuschapterhind  (last
visited Sept. 9, 2002).
176 For example, in the year 2000 approximately 69% of all non-business bankrupt
debtors chose Chapter 7. See id.
177 Some debts are excepted from discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2000) (amended by
Pub. L. No. 107-204, Tit. XIII, § 803, 116 Stat. 745, 801 (2002)). Secured debts, such as a
home mortgage or an automobile loan, must be repaid in full if the debtor is to retain the
collateral. Sec id. § 724(b). Therefore, many debtors reaffirm these obligations and the
debts survive the discharge. See, e.g., Culhane & White, supra note 14, at 713 (finding that
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future income. In theory, the Chapter 7 debtor receives this discharge
in exchange for a damaged credit reputation and the loss of any assets
not protected either by state property exemptions or certain bank-
ruptcy specific exemptions available in a few states. 178
 In reality, ma-
nipulab1e179 and generousim property exemptions ensure that only a
tiny fraction of Chapter 7 debtors forfeit any assets to their general
unsecured creditors. 181
Anyone can file for relief under Chapter 7; one need not even be
insolvent. Nevertheless, Chapter 7 does not offer effective relief to
some debtors either because they would lose significant assets 182 or
25% of cases sampled had a reaffirmation agreement in the file); Warren, supra note 14, at
499 (claiming that more than 40% of debtors reaffirm some debt).
179
 The Bankruptcy Code gives the debtor the choice of the property exemptions of
the slate in which the debtor lives or certain uniform bankruptcy exemptions. See 11
U.S.C. § 522(b) (1978). Section 522(d), however, also gives the states the right to "opt-out"
and deny their debtors the use of the uniform exemptions. See id. § 522(d). Thirty-seven
states have chosen to "opt-out" tinder § 522(d). SccPosner et al., supra note 170, at 16.
179
 See, e.g., Warren, supra note 14, at 495 ("Exemptions were designed to help ensure
that families were not put out of their homes in times of temporary financial reversal, but
they have become investment vehicles for savvy debtors to protect significant cash assets
from creditors.") (citation omitted).
199
 For example, twenty-three states allowed married couples to exempt at least
$60,000 of home equity. See, e.g., 14 MARK BANE El' AL, COWER ON BANKRUPTCY AL-1—
WY-4 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th rev. ed. 1996 & Stipp. 2001) (listing the home-
stead exemptions of each state). By contrast, in 1995 the median home equity for all fami-
lies with a head of household at least twenty-five years of age was less than $15,000. See Jo-
seph M. Anderson, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, The Wealth of U.S. Families; Analysis of
Recent Census Data 6 (Nov. 10, 1999), available at
http://www.bls.cen.sus.gov/sipp/workpapr/wp233.pdf.
181
 Sec Bankr. Admin., U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Case Receipts Paid to Creditors
Professionals 1-2 (1994) (on file with the United States General Accounting Office, Wash-
ington. D.C.) ("Of the 1.2 million Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases closed in statistical years
1991 and 1992, about 5% (56,994) generated some receipts for distribution to profession-
als and creditors."); see also WARREN & 'WESTBROOK, supra note 86, at 426 ('The property
exemptions may make little difference because the debtors who file for bankruptcy may
not own much of value that isn't already mortgaged to the hilt."). These figures may over-
state the repayment in Chapter 7 as they include business bankruptcies filed in Chapter 7
and business bankruptcies account for nearly eighty percent of all creditor receipts in
Chapter 7. See NBRC REPORT, SUM note 90, at 137. This does not mean that consumers
repay nothing in Chapter 7; they will often repay their secured creditors or reaffirm their
secured loans.
182
 Although almost no debtors in Chapter 7 have non-exempt assets, it is possible that
bankrupt debtors who do have assets choose another chapter in order to retain their
property. Sec Ian Domowitz & Robert L. Sartain, Determinants of the Consumer Bankruptcy
Decision, 54 J. FIN. 403, 416-17 (1999) [hereinafter Determinants]; Ian Domowitz & Robert
L. Sartain, Incentives and Bankruptcy Chapter Choice: Evidence from the Reform Act of 1978, 28 J.
LEGAL. Sum. 461, 477-82 (1999) [hereinafter Incentives] (finding debtors with more equity
in their home or car were more likely to choose Chapter 13); Romona K2. Heck, An
Econometric Analysis of interstate Differences in Nonbusiness Bankruptcy and Chapter Thirteen
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because they have significant debts that they could not discharge in
Chapter 7. 183 Moreover, there is some evidence that bankruptcy
judges and lawyers in some jurisdictions steer debtors away from
Chapter 7, 184 Finally, the code allows judges to dismiss Chapter 7
filings that are a substantial abuse of the Bankruptcy Code. 183 Con-
gress added this provision in 1984 following extensive lobbying by
creditors188 who were concerned with what they perceived to be a
large increase in the number of bankruptcy filings187 and who wanted
to force more debtors to either choose Chapter 13 or avoid bank-
ruptcy altogether. This provision, however, does not appear to have
had its desired effect as the number of bankruptcy filings has sharply
increased, 188 the ratio of Chapter 7 to Chapter 13 filings has remained
fairly stable, 189 and the rate at which bankrupt debtors repay unse-
cured creditors remains close to zero.'" As a consequence, the con-
Rates, 15 J. CONSUMER AFF. 13, 13-16, 29-30 (1981) (examining factors influencing state
Chapter XIII rates under the Federal Bankruptcy Act); Jon P. Nelson, Consumer Bankruptcy
and Chapter Choke: State Panel Evidence, 17 CONTEMN. ECON. POCY 552, 553, 560 (1999). In
addition, in Chapter 7 debtors risk losing their most valuable assets—such as their car or
their home—unless they can either repay their secured claims in full or can convince their
secured creditors to allow them to reaffirm their debts. Sec 11 U.S.C. § 724 (b).
las See 11 U.S.C. § 523.
um 'there is some empirical support for this proposition in that scholars are unable to
explain differences in choice of chapter by other theories tested. See, e.g., Teresa A. Sulli-
van et al., Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States: A Study of Alleged Abuse and of Local Legal
Culture, 20 J. CONSUMER Pot.'y 223, 244-45 (1997) [hereinafter Study of Abuse]: Teresa A.
Sullivan et al., The Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty rears of Evidence from the Federal
Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HAIM 1.L.& Pun. PoCv 801, 806, 830 (1994) thereinafter Persistence]
(interpreting inabiliiy to explain variation in percentage of bankrupt debtors choosing
Chapter 13 in different bankruptcy districts to be evidence of the importance of a local
legal culture).
' 88 See II U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000).
166 See. e.g., Gross, supra note 102, at 77-85 (describing lobbying efforts leading to
amendments to Bankruptcy Code in 1984).
187 In 1978, there were 172,000 non-business bankruptcy filings. See Michelle" White,
Personal Bankruptcy Under the 1973 Bankruptcy Code: An Economic Analysis, 63 IND. LJ. 1, 29
(1987-1988). By 1984 this figure had risen to 284,517. See Bankruptcy Filings 1980-2001,
supra note 93.
186 Between 1984 and 2001 the number of non-business bankruptcy filings rose from
284,517 to 1,[52,030. See Bankruptcy Filings 1980-2001, supra note 93.
169 In 1984, approximately 68.8% of non-business filings were made under Chapter 7.
See Am. Bankr. Inst., Annual U.S. Non-Business Bankruptcy Filings by Chapter 1980-1984,
at http://www.abiworld ,org/stats/1980stateannualnonbuschapter.hunl (last visited Sept.
22, 2002) thereinafter Non-Business Bankruptcy Filings 1980-1984]. By 2001 this figure
had risen to 70.1%. See Am. Bankr. Inst., Annual U.S. Non-Business Bankruptcy Filings by
Chapter 2000-2001, at http:// ,,vww.abiworld.org/stats/00stateannualnonbuschapterhunl
(last visited Sept. 22, 2002).
190 See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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sinner credit industry is again pushing for reforms, commonly called
"means testing," that would force more debtors into Chapter 13. 191
Whether these reforms would have any effect. remains an open ques-
tio11. 192
Unlike Chapter 7, Chapter 13 is not open to all debtors. Chapter
13's predecessor, Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 193 was
restricted to "wage earners." 194 In 1978, Congress broadened eligibility
for Chapter 13 to all individuals with regular income and debts below
certain ceilings.'" As discussed below, the meaning of the term "regu-
lar income" has important implications for the feasibility of a reor-
ganization-based approach to bankruptcy)"
Debtors filing under Chapter 13 propose plans that require them
to make a series of payments for a period of up to five years. 197 The
judge will approve the plan if it is proposed in good faith, is feasible,
and meets certain repayment requirements)" If debtors make their
payments, the judge grants them a discharge of their remaining debts,
with relatively few exceptions. 199 Chapter 13 offers debtors a superdis-
charge that is broader than the discharge available in Chapter 7. 2"
191 See, e.g., Warren, supra note 14, at 486-88, 492-93 (describing the lobbying efforts
of the consumer credit industry).
192 See Marianne B. Cu!bane & Michaela M. White, Taking the Nero Consumer Bankruptcy
Model for a Test Drive: Means-Testing Real Chapter 7 Debtors, 7 Ass. BANKR. INST. L. Rev. 27, 31
(1999) (finding that only 3.6% of debtors would be classified as can pay" tinder the stat-
ute); Jones & Zywicki, supra note 13 (discussing Culhane & NVIiite as well as other studies
that find a greater fraction of debtors that can pay).
193
 Section 74 was passed in the Act of March 3, 1933, Ch. 204, 47 Stat. 1467 (repealed
1938), It was later revised and incorporated into Chapters XI, XII and XIII in the Chan-
dler Act of June 22, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840-940 (1938) repeated by Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
191
 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 696, 30 Stat. 544, § 606 (repealed 1978).
193 Chapter 13 is restricted to individual debtors (other than stockbrokers and com-
modity brokers) with regular income who have non-contingent, liquidated unsecured
debts of less than $290,525 and non-contingent, liquidated secured debts of less than
$871,550. 11 U.S.C. § 109(a), (e) (2000) (dollar amounts updated by revision of certain
dollar amounts in the Bankruptcy Code prescribed under § 104(b) of the Code, 66 Fed.
Reg. 10.910, 10,911 (Feb. 20, 2001)).
196 See infra notes 371-406 and accompanying text.
197
 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d). Debtors may propose plans that will last less than three years if
they will repay their creditors in full, but this is rare. Sec In re Leser, 939 F.2d 669, 672-73
(8th Cir. 1991) (quoting In re Davidson, 72 B.R. 384, 387 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987) (com-
menting that plans providing for 100% payout are relatively rare)). Bankruptcy practitio-
ners usually use the terms "thirty-six months" or "sixty months" instead of "three years" or
"five years."
" Sec 11 U.S.C. § 1325.
" See id. § 1328(a).
200 Compare id. § 1328 (a), with id. § 727(a)—(e).
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Chapter 13's predecessor, Chapter XIII, required debtors to ob-
tain the consent of each of their secured creditors and the majority of
their unsecured creditors before judges would approve their plan. 2° 1
As a consequence, virtually all Chapter XIII plans offered full repay-
ment to all creditors, though often without interest. 202 Today, Chapter
13 plans that propose full repayment, even without interest, appear to
be more the exception than the norm, 203 and a series of code provi-
sions determine the amount that a debtor must repay. 204
Court fees205 and priority claims, including certain tax and family
law claims,206 must be paid in full. The debtor will also lose any collat-
eral held by a secured creditor unless the plan provides for the full
repayment of the secured claim, though perhaps without interest, or
the secured creditor agrees to accept less."' Because, however, the
20 i 11 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1052 (1970). Incidentally, the composition agreements made
possible by the 1874 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 required creditor con-
sent of the majority of creditors in number and three-fourths in value. See Ch. 390, § 17, 18
Stat. 183 (1874) (repealed 1878).
202 One survey found that approximately 99% of Chapter XIII plans proposed to pay
all debts in full. DAVIS) T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS,
REFORM 94 (1971); accord B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL 1 9.01,
at 9-3 (2d ed. 1986). The consent requirement gave creditors significant bargaining power
because many of the protections now afforded debtors in non-bankruptcy law did not exist
during the term of the Bankruptcy Act or were introduced relatively late in its tenure. For
example, prior to a Supreme Court ruling in 1969, many states allowed unsecured credi-
tors to attach property of the debtor prior to a judgment or even a hearing. Sec Sniadach v.
Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341-42 (1969). Federal limitations on garnishment were
not in place until 1968, 15 U.S.C. § 1672 (2000), and many states offered little limitation
On its Me. See 2 HOWARD j, ALPERIN & ROLAND F. CHASE, CONSUMER LAW: SALES PRAC-
•ICEIS, CREDIT REGULATION §§ 630-631, 352-354 (1986). Furthermore, the Fair Debt Col-
lection Practices Act was not passed until 1977. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o; Pub. L. No. 95-
109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 874. In addition, few states had similar provisions prior to the
mid to late 1970s. See ALPERIN & CHASE, supra, at 352-54.
2" See In re Leser, 939 F.2d at 672-73 (quoting In re Davidson, 72 B.R. 384, 387 (Bank•.
D. Colo. 1987) (commenting that plans providing for 100% payout are relatively rare)).
But see William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy as Con-
sumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer Banktruptcy, 68 Am. BANKR. L.J. 397,
411 tbl. 2 (1994) (showing that in some jurisdictions a significant number of confirmed
Chapter 13 plans do propose 100% repayment).
204 See 11 U.S.C. § 1326.
2°5 Id. § 1325(a)(2).
290 1d, §§ 1322 (a) (2), 507.
207 See id. § 1322(a) (2). If a secured creditor holds collateral that is worth less than the
value of its loan, its secured claim wilt equal the amount that it would cost the debtor to
replace the collateral; the remainder of the secured creditor's loan is treated as an unse-
cured claim. See Assoc. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 961 (1997). Note that only
the secured claim mast be promised full repayment for the debtor to retain the collateral.
11 U.S.C. § 506(a). This limitation does not apply, however, to the most important secured
creditors, the mortgage lenders, who must receive the entire amount of their loans, includ-
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amount. that the debtor must pay the secured creditor depends on the
value of the debtor's physical assets rather than the value of her earn-
ings, this Article focuses on how much the debtor must pay her unse-
cu•ed creditors.
There are two primary tests for how much debtors must pay their
general unsecured creditors in Chapter 13: the "best interests of the
creditors" test of § 1325(a) (4) and the "disposable income" test of
§ 1325(14. An unsecured creditor May object under § 1325(a) (4) if it.
does not receive as much as it would have received in a Chapter 7 liq-
t ion . 2°8
 Though there is some evidence that debtors with
significant non-exempt. assets are more likely to choose Chapter 13, 209
the near complete lack of repayment. for unsecured creditors in
Chapter 7210
 implies that this "best interests of the creditors" test may
mean little in practice.
Between 1978 and 1984, the only explicit test for determining the
debtor's payment to unsecured creditors was the "best interests of the
creditors" test of § 1325(a) (4). 211
 Because so few debtors have any
non-exempt assets, 212
 and because creditor consent was no longer re-
quired, judges accustomed to Chapter XIII plans that proposed full
repayment213
 began to see Chapter 13 plans that proposed little or no
repayment for unsecured creditors. It seems that this change was too
much for some judges, and many refused to confirm plans that paid
too little to creditors on the grounds that they were not proposed in
good faith as required by the Bankruptcy Code. 214 While this use of
the good faith requirement. was controversial at the time, it became
even more so after the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judge-
ship Act of 1984.215
ing any interest specified in the mortgages, if debtors are to keep their homes. Sec Nobel-
man v. Am. Say. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 325-26, 331 (1993) (interpreting 11 U.S.C.
§1322(b)(2)).
2051 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (4).
21 '9
 Sec discussion supra note 182.
210 Sce sources cited supra note 181.
211 Seel] U	 § 1325(a)(4).
212 Sec .511 pia note 180 and accompanying text.
213
 Sec supra note 192 and accompanying text.
214 See, e.g., In re Raburn, 4 B.R. 624, 625 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1980) (refusing to confirm
plan unless it paid 70% of unsecured claims); In in Burrell, 2 B.A. 650, 653 (Bankr, N,D.
Cal. 1980) ("Although debtor's plan meets the best effort test, it falls considerably short of
meeting the substantial payment requirement.").
215 See. e.g., Noreen v. Slattengren, 974 F.2d 75, 76 (8th Cir. 1992) (claiming that 11
U.S.C. § 1325(b) subsumed most of the factors courts may have found relevant in deter-
mining good faith, but the totality of the circumstances test remained in place.); In in
Carsrtid, 161 B.R. 246, 250-51 (Bankr. S.D.S.D. 1993) ("The traditional totality of circum-
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As part of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984,216 Congress added the "disposable income" test of
§ 1325(b). Section 1325 (b) states that a court may not confirm a plan
over the bankruptcy trustee's or a creditor's objection unless the
debtor proposes full repayment or the debtor proposes to pay into the
plan all of his projected disposable income for a period of three
years. 217 This "disposable income" test has generated a substantial
amount of controversy, 218 and despite its central role in determining
the debtor's required repayment and frequent litigation about its
meaning, substantial questions remain. 219
The confirmation of a plan does not end the Chapter 13 process.
A debtor who subsequently finds his plan too onerous has several op-
tions. Within bankruptcy, the debtor can apply for a hardship dis-
charge 220 or convert the case to Chapter 7. 221 Provided the case had
not been previously converted from another chapter, the debtor may
dismiss the plan 222 and either re-file or rely on federal and state non-
stances approach ... not addressed by the legislative amendments were preserved."); see
generally Brandon L. Johnson, Good Faith and Disposable Income: Should the Good Faith Inquiry
Evaluate the Proposed Amount of Repayment?, 36 GONZ. L Rev. 375, 381-86 (2000-2001) (re-
viewing cases).
216 The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
217 .Disposable income" is defined as Income which is received by the debtor and
which is not reasonably necessary to be expended 	 for the maintenance or support of
the debtor or a dependent of the debtor ...." 11	 § 1325(b) (2) (2000).
218 At first a few courts held that they could ignore this provision, reasoning that the
term "may not" is merely permissive. Sac e.g., In TC Schy nr t , 68 B.R. 52, 63 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1985) (noting the language of § 1325(b) (1) indicates that Congress intended to grant a
discretionary power to the court to refuse to approve the plan, rather than to mandate
denial of confirmation); In re Otero, 48 B.R. 704, 708 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985) (reading the
section as a voluntary section to be applied at the court's discretion). While these decisions
have not been explicitly overruled, few, if any, recent courts have adopted their holding
because these early courts ignored a section of the Bankruptcy Code that explicitly states
that the term "may not" is prohibitive and not permissive. See 11 U.S.C. § 102(4).
219 Much of the controversy about this provision centers on the difficulty courts face
when determining a debtor's "reasonably necessary" expenses. See, e.g., LoPucki, supra
note 23, at 471-73. This Article's analysis can readily extend to this issue. A utopian bank-
ruptcy system would account for differences in each debtor's cost of living and allow each
debtor to consume as much as he would have contracted for in advance. To the extent,
however, that courts are unable to determine this amount, either directly or by using ob-
servable characteristics of the debtor as a proxy for what the debtor would have agreed to,
they must ignore expenses entirely or each debtor will have an incentive to overstate his
cost of living.
22° 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b).
221 See id. §§ 1307(a), 1307(e).
222 Id, § 1307(b).
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bankruptcy laws for protection. 223
 Finally, § 1329 allows the debtor,
the Chapter 13 trustee, and the unsecured creditors to seek a
modification of the plan prior to the completion of payments. 224
While parties may seek modifications for many reasons, 225 this Article
focuses on requests for a modification of the required repayment in
response to a change in the debtor's financial condition.
B. Bankruptcy and the Grasshopper Problem
Part. II implies that in managing the grasshopper problem, courts
should treat negligent and willful misbehavior separately. To a large
extent, the existing bankruptcy system does just that. Bankruptcy
grants relief to debtors who spend too much or engage in other neg-
ligent behavior, but Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code denies relief
for willful misbehavior. By its terms Chapter 13, however, will grant a
discharge for many forms of willful misbehavior. Courts have strug-
gled to reconcile Chapter 13's expanded discharge with sound policy
goals.
Few, if any, commentators argue that courts should deny bank-
ruptcy relief to the spendthrifts or the negligent, and proposals to
partially eliminate Chapter 13's expanded discharge have generated
little public comment. 2" This silence is explained in part by bank-
ruptcy's similarities to, and differences from, standard insurance.
1. The Negligent. Grasshopper and Means Testing
The utopian bankruptcy system denies relief to the debtor who
negligently borrows too much or fails to take sufficient. precautions to
avoid financial distress; essentially, utopian bankruptcy denies relief to
the negligent.. 227
 By contrast, the existing bankruptcy system does not
223
 Because federal limitations on garnishment do not apply in a bankruptcy proceed-
ing, it is possible that debtors could be required to repay more in bankruptcy than they
would under non-bankruptcy law. See 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (2000).
2'24 Scc 11 U S.C.§ 1329 (1978).
225 See generally Harry L. Deffebach, Posteonfirmation Modification of Chapter 13 Plans:
Sheep in Wolf's Clothing,. 9 BANKR. DEV,I. 153, 155-66 (1992).
226 0f course, this silence may also be explained by the absence of an effective interest
group to lobby on behalf of tort victims. Proposed legislation would significantly erode the
superdischarge, eliminating the debtor's ability to obtain a discharge for: i) loans procured
by fraud or false pretenses; ii) debts for fraud, embezzlement or larceny; and iii) debts for
willful and malicious injury to a person. Sec H.R. 5745, 107th Cong. § 314(b) (4) (2002).
Debtors would still be able, however, to obtain a discharge of willful and malicious torts
that resulted in damage to property. Id.
227 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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distinguish between the negligent and the unfortunate. Some debtors
are in bankruptcy because they could not control their spending hab-
its, others because they suffered some unavoidable expense, and still
others because of a combination of misfortune and misbehavior. 228
They all receive the same discharge, however, and bankruptcy law
makes little or no effort to distinguish between them.
Chapter 7 does allow the bankruptcy judge to dismiss a filing if
granting relief would be a substantial abuse of the Bankruptcy
Code,229 and in looking for abuse courts do inquire into the totality of
the circumstances. 29° Courts focus, however, on whether the debtor
can in fact pay his debts rather than on whether the debtor should
have acted more responsibly to avoid incurring such debt in the first
place. 231 That is, courts focus on whether the debtor needs bank-
ruptcy relief rather than on why the debtor needs bankruptcy relief.
Therefore, the substantial abuse provision appears designed primarily
to deal with the opossum problem rather than the grasshopper prob-
lem. 232
228 Most, if not all, bankruptcy scholars would agree that at least some debtors are in
bankruptcy because of their poor spending habits, though they would likely disagree as to
the size of this group. See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 13, at 7 ( -It would be hard for anyone
to disagree with the proposition that Americans have too much debt and not enough sav-
ings, and that if we had less debt and more savings, there would be less bankruptcy.");
Jones & Zywicki, supra note 13, at 224 ("In short, one can simply recharacterize the 'debt
causes bankruptcy' thesis as 'overspending causes bankruptcy"); LoPticki, supra note 23,
at 464 ("The grasshoppers eat at the pizza parlor on Friday night and buy the new sneakers
and the houses. They quit their jobs when the going gets tough. The fallout lands on their
credit cards. When winter comes, they discharge the credit card debt in bankruptcy.");
Warren, supra note 13, at 1084 ("Some incur [excessive] debt with little thought about how
it adds up, perhaps like the grasshopper who never thought about the coming winter.").
228 See 11 U.S.C.§ 707(b) (2000).
288 See, e.g., In re Kornfield, 164 F.3d 778, 784 (2c1 Cir. 1999); In re Lamanna, 153 F.3d
1 (1st Cir. 1998); In re Green, 934 F.2d 568, 572-73 (4th Cir. 1991); In re Edwards, 50 B.R.
933, 936 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
231 While most, if not all, courts would consider the debtor's ability to pay in the sub-
stantial abuse analysis, there is broad disagreement as to the meaning of the phrase "sub-
stantial abuse." Some courts hold that an ability to pay one's debts alone supports a finding
of substantial abuse. See, e.g., United States Tr. v. Harris, 960 F.2d 74, 77 (8th Cir. 1992);
accord In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908, 914-15 (9th Cir. 1988), Other courts, however, find that an
ability to pay one's debts is not sufficient by itself to find substantial abuse. Sec In te Gwen,
934 F.2d at 572-73. Still, most courts seem to regard the ability to pay as the primary con-
sideration in the substantial abuse analysis. See, e.g., In re Stewart, 175 F.3d 796, 809 (10th
Cir. 1999); see also In re Larnanna, 153 F.3d at 4-5.
282 Occasionally, one finds a case that focuses primarily on the circumstances sur-
rounding the incurrence of the debt. These cases, however, generally involve intentional,
as opposed to negligent, behavior. See, e.g., In re Bruno, 68 B.R. 101, 102-03 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1986) (dismissing filing because husband sought to discharge debts resulting from
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Although numerous scholars have written about the grasshopper
problem of bankruptcy, 233
 there are no serious proposals for denying
a bankruptcy discharge to those who overspend or otherwise negli-
gently cause their own financial distress. Even the credit industry has
not tried to limit the grasshopper's access to bankruptcy, 2" preferring
instead to lobby for means testing that would identify those debtors
who can pay more. As a matter of theory, means testing requires only
that the debtor prove that he needs relief; means testing does not ask
the debtor to explain why he needs relief. Therefore, like the substan-
tial abuse provision, means testing appears aimed primarily at the
opossum problem rather than the grasshopper problem.
In light of the analysis of Part II, this approach is unsurprising.
The first lasting bankruptcy law in the United States, 2" the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898236
 was passed at about the same time that courts
began to allow individuals to insure against liability for negligent. mis-
conduct. 237
 Because bankruptcy is another form of insurance, the
justifications for insurance that protects the negligent would seem to
apply to bankruptcy as well. Many, if not most, bankrupt debtors are
unable to pay their debts both because they suffered some unfortu-
nate shock such as divorce or unemployment and because they bor-
rowed too much to allow them to withstand such a shock. 238
 Society
may not trust the ability of bankruptcy judges to determine if these
debtors behaved prudently and therefore deserve relief. Moreover .,
even when it is clear that debtors spent their way into bankruptcy, so-
ciety may not want. to deny relief because many believe that. some
debtors just cannot resist the temptation of easy credit. 239
murder of his wife). As discussed below, Chapter 7 has more direct limitations on relief for
such behavior. See infra note 248 and accompanying text.
235 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
254 See, e.g., Warren, supra note 14, at 493 ("The creditors as a group did not quarrel
with relief for those in need; instead, they emphasized dint consumer bankruptcy should
be available only to those in need.").
235
 The Constitution grants Congress the power to enact uniform bankruptcy laws. Sec
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Prior to 1898, however, Congress enacted three bankruptcy
acts that together lasted less titan twenty years, Congress repealed the Bankruptcy Act of
1800 in 1803, 2 Slat. 248 (1803), the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 in 1843, Act of March 3, 1843,
5 Stat. 614 (1843), and the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 in 1878, Act ofJune 7, 1878, 20 Stat. 99
(1878). Of course, state law did afford early debtors some protection from their creditors.
See generally CI IAR LES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1934).
236
 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 696, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
2" See supra note 127 and accompanying text,
2 '48
 See, e.g., Warren, supra note 13, at 1081 (discussing the characteristics of bankrupt
debtors).
2" See sepia notes 137-148 and accompanying text.
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But the second-best bankruptcy system does not ignore the
grasshopper problem altogether. Precisely because courts cannot or
will not identify the negligent, the second-best bankruptcy system of-
fers only partial relief to the unfortunate as wel1. 24° Debtors receive
only partial insurance to the extent that they are worse off after bank-
ruptcy than they would have been had they behaved in the proper
manner. In practice, the bankrupt debtor will emerge with severely
damaged credit, and, possibly, a damaged social reputation. 241 On the
other hand, the debtor will have enjoyed, at least temporarily, a
higher standard of living than if he had behaved prudently. In addi-
tion, the debtor may still retain some of the assets purchased on
credit. Therefore, bankruptcy should ask the debtor to repay some-
thing to his creditors.
Though debtors in Chapter 7 pay virtually nothing to their unse-
cured creditors, 242 they often reaffirm debts to secured creditors so
that they may retain their home, their car, or other assets pledged as
collatera1. 243 Whether this system causes the debtor to suffer enough is
open to debate, and if means testing forced debtors to pay more in
bankruptcy', it could reduce the level of insurance they receive.
Whether this means testing is warranted remains controversial as
commentators strongly disagree as to the importance of the grass-
hopper problem in bankruptcy. 244
2. The Willful and Malicious Grasshopper, the Superdischarge and
Good Faith
Because neither private contracts nor public insurance programs
relieve individuals of the consequences of their willful misbehavior, 245
Part II suggests that bankruptcy should not do so either. Traditionally,
bankruptcy adopted this approach. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898
240 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
241 See, e.g., Todd j. Zywicki, Bankruptcy Law as Social Legislation, 5 Tex. Rev. L. & Pm.,
393,395-408 (2001).
242 Sec supra note 181.
243 Sec supra note 181. This approach does offer some nth:images in that the debtor
and creditor can contract in advance for the minimum amount that the debtor must repay
in bankruptcy. Unfortunately, the usefulness of this strategy is limited by an inability to
pledge one's future income as collateral. Because the amount that must be repaid in
Chapter 7 is independent of the debtor's future income, this test provides imperfect insur-
ance and is subject to abuse.
2J4
	 Zywicki, supra note 13, at 192-200,248, with Warren, supra note 13,
at 1084-87,1100-01,
245 Sec supra notes 142-147 and accompanying text.
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barred the discharge of debts arising from most forms of willful mis-
conduct whether under a Chapter VII liquidation 248
 or a Chapter XIII
wage earner's plan. 247
 Today, Chapter 7 largely retains and expands
the exceptions to discharge of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1898.248
By contrast, Chapter 13 provides a superdischarge that is broader
titan the discharge available in Chapter 7 and can forgive, among
other things: i) loans procured by fraud or false pretenses, ii) debts
for fraud, embezzlement, or larceny, and iii) debts for willful and ma-
licious ihjury.249
 Because of the superdischarge, and because tor(
claims often do not count toward the dollar limitations of Chapter
13, 2" the reported Chapter 13 case law is populated in part by debtors
facing judgments or claims for frattd, 251
 embezzlement,252
 misappro-
246 See 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1970) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)).
217
 Sec id. § 1060 (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a), (c)—(d) (2000)).
249 Sec id. § 523.
249 See id. § 1328(n). Originally, Chapter 13 would discharge judgments for criminal
restitution as well. See Pa. Dep't, of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 564 (1990).
Shortly after this case, Congress excepted criminal restitution from the superdischarge. See
Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, Tit. XXXI; § 3103(3), 104 Stat. 9789,
4916 (1990) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (3)). In 1994, however, Congress changed its
mind, and current law no longer excepts criminal restitution from the superdischarge
(although § 1328(a) (3) still applies to cases filed before Oct. 22, 1994). See Pub. L. 103-
394, § 501 (d) (38) (b) (1994). Proposed legislation would significantly erode the superdis-
charge, eliminating the debtor's ability to obtain a discharge for: i) loans procured by
fraud or false pretenses; ii) debts for fraud, embezzlement or larceny; and di) debts for
willful and malicious injury to a person. See H.R. 5745, 107th Cong. § 314(b) (4) (2002).
Debtors would still be able, however, to obtain a discharge of willful and malicious torts
that resulted in damage to property. Id.
259
 The Bankruptcy Code limits Chapter 13 to debtors with non-contingent, liquidated
unsecured debts of less than $290,525. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (dollar amounts updated by
Revision of Certain Dollar Amounts in the Bankruptcy Code prescribed under Section
104(b) of the Code, 66 Fed. Reg. 10.910, 10.911 (Feb. 20, 2001)). Pending tort claims,
however, will generally not count toward this amount either because they are contingent
(the tort claimant must win at trial) or they are unliquidated (the court cannot determine
the amount of the claim until the trial). See, e.g., 14 MARK BANE ET AL, supra note 180. at
11 109.06 121[N-[c].
254 See, e.g., In to Peterson, 228 B.R. 19, 22 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998); hi re McBroom, 51
B.R. 953, 955 (Bankr.	 Va. 1985).
252 See, e.g., In re Nipper, 224 B.R. 756, 757 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1998); In re Britt, 211 B.R.
74. 76 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997).
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priation, 253 aggravated assault, 251 intentional shooting,255 sexual as-
sault, 256 sexual abuse of a minor, 257 and other willful misconduct.
Congress left little record to indicate why it adopted the super-
discharge. The commission appointed to study bankruptcy recom-
mended that Congress retain the existing exceptions to discharge in
both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13, and the legislative history reveals no
justification for why this recommendation was rejected. 258 The super-
discharge has changed little since 1978, 259 however, and a recent study
by the National Bankruptcy Review Commissicm did not suggest a
substantive change to this poliey. 260 This continued support for the
superdischarge must be reconciled with the law's general hostility to-
ward insurance that protects an individual from the consequences of
his willful misconduct.20
The traditional explanation for the superdischarge is that it in-
duces debtors to file tinder Chapter 13 and thereby increases the re-
payment for all creditors. 262 Given that in 1978, Chapter 13 did not
require the debtor to repay any more than he would have in Chapter
7, 265 this explanation for the original superdischarge is questionable.
It is at least possible, however, that Congress thought that debtors
would pay more, 204 and some may support the continued existence of
255 See, e.g., In re Kelly, 217 B.R. 273, 274 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1997); In re Ledin, 179 B.R.
721, 722 (Bankr. M.D. Ha. 1995).
254 See, e.g., In re Day, 1999 WI,. 96117, *1 (7th Cir. 1999) (Table decision at 172 F.3d 52)
(aggravated battery); In re Easley. 72 B.R. 948, 948 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1987).
255 See Handeen v. LeMaire, 898 F.2d 1346, 1347 (8th Cir. 1990).
256 See, e.g., Solomon v. Cosby, 67 F.3d 1128, 1130 (4th Cir. 1995); Petty v. Belanger, 232
B.R. 543, 545 (D. Mass. 1999) (decided under Chapter 7, although debtor originally filed
for bankruptcy under Chapter 13); In re Carsrud, 161 B.R. at 247.
257 See, e.g., Slattengren, 974 F.2d at 75.
256 Robert L. Hughes, Chapter 13's Potential for Abuse, 58 N.C. L. REv. 831, 843 (1980)
("Though Section 1328(a) represents a congressional rejection of the Commission's posi-
tion on t [he] issue [of the exceptions to discharge], the legislative history offers no expla-
nation for that decision.").
259 Since 1978, Congress has excepted some debts from the superdischarge, including
criminal restitution (from 1990-1994). See supra note 249.
266 See, e.g., NBRC REPORT, supra note 90, at 290-91. Notwithstanding the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission's views, however, proposed legislation would significantly
erode the superdischarge. See supra note 249.
261 See supra notes 143-144 and accompanying text.
262 See, e.g., NBRC Rcroicr, supra note 90, at 290-91.
265 See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
264 See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 258, at 845. Moreover, what little legislative history that
does exists suggests that some Congressmen accepted the superdischarge under the pre-
sumption that the requirement of creditor approval would result in some check on this
provision. See Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States,
H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. I, at 175 (1973) (In considering proposed
2002]	 Optimal Bankruptcy in a Non-Optimal World
	 51
the superdischarge if the disposable income requirement now results
in a greater repayment under Chapter 13. 265
Even if the superdischarge maximizes the repayment to the
creditor, however, the same could be said of an insurance policy that
covers willful torts; the victim could demand payment from a solvent
insurance company rather than an insolvent tortfeasor. While bank-
ruptcy effectively mandates that the creditor insure the debtor against
the debtor's willful misconduct, non-bankruptcy insurance law gener-
ally prohibits insurance policies that cover willful misconduct. 266 Courts
refuse to allow such insurance policies on public policy grounds, rea-
soning that these insurance contracts will lessen the deterrence that
judgments for willful torts are designed to deliver. 267
 Because the su-
perdischarge also lessens the deterrent effect of the tort law, one
needs a justification for why bankruptcy requires this insurance.
Recall that there are two justifications for insurance policies that
cover negligence. First, judges and juries will sometimes err when de-
ciding whether a defendant was negligent and therefore society
should allow the individual to insure against this error. 268 For exam-
ple, a court could wrongfully find that a motorist negligently drove at
an excessive speed and caused an accident. This same argument ap-
plies to intentional misconduct, though perhaps with lesser force. For
example, a court may wrongfully find that a motorist intentionally
struck a pedestrian when in fact he did so by accident. There is no
reason to believe, however, that Congress changed its view of the
competency of the judiciary in the late 1970s.
By contrast, the period surrounding the passage of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978 did see a change in the law's basic assump-
legislation analogous to the current Chapter 13, the commission stated, If the debtor
wants to pay his debts pursuant to a plan, and if the creditors am willing to go along, he should
be allowed to do so. The fact that a discharge would not be available in a liquidation case
should furnish a greater incentive for the debtor to perform under the plan.'(emphasis
added). Perhaps Congress assumed that this would mean that Chapter 13 plans would
continue to routinely include full repayment of unsecured creditors and did not
sufficiently revisit the issue when the creditor consent requirement was dropped.
265 See, e.g., NIIRC REPORT, supra note 90, at 291.
266 See, e,g., Ambassador Ins. Co. v. MOntes, 388 A.2d 603, 606 (NJ. 1978) (adopting a
minority rule allowing such insurance policies if they benefit innocent third parties, but
recognizing that a majority of courts do not allow insurance for willful misconduct); KEE-
Tort & Wunss, supra note 128, at 519 (stating that insurance law generally prohibits insur-
ance policies covering willful misconduct).
'267 See, e.g., Monies, 388 A.2d at 606 (noting that the majority of courts reason that
"[w] ere a person able to insure against the economic consequences of his intentional
wrongdoing, the deterrence attributable to financial responsibility would be missing.").
268
 Sec supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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dons about the ability of individuals to control their own actions, the
second explanation for insurance that covers negligent behavior. 2G9 To
the extent that individuals are simply unable to control their own ac-
tions, the deterrence value of judgments becomes much less impor-
tant relative to the other goals that these judgments serve, such as
compensating the victim.
This shift in view of individual responsibility can be most clearly
seen in the criminal law. For example, the insanity defense tradition-
ally focused on whether the defendant understood the nature and qual-
ity of his actions or the wrongfulness of his actions. 27° In 1962, how-
ever, the American Law Institute wrote the Model Penal Code, which
expanded the insanity defense to include defendants who could ap-
preciate the wrongfulness of their actions but who were unable to con-
trol their actions and to conform their conduct to the requirements of
law.271 The D.C. Circuit adopted this approach in 1972, 272 and during
the 1960s and 1970s a significant minority of state legislatures and
courts, and almost all of the federal circuit courts, 273 followed suit.
Similarly, this period witnessed an expansion of the doctrine of dimin-
ished capacity that reduces a homicide from murder to manslatigh-
ter.274 This culminated in the now infamous "Twinkle defense" in
which an individual shot and killed both the mayor of San Francisco
and a supervisor but was found guilty of only manslaughter after argu-
ing that he was suffering from depression as evidenced by an excessive
consumption of Twinkies. 275 The "Twinkie defense" and John Hinck-
ley's acquittal of the attempted murder of President Reagan helped
spark a backlash against this trend. 276 This backlash came too late,
269 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
27° See NrNatighten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 719 (H.L. 1843).
271 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 4 n.9, 348-49 (3d ed. 2000). Prior to this
time, many jurisdictions had adopted an Irresistible impulse" test that also looked to the
ability of the defendant to control his conduct. Sec id. at 339-40.
272 See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
275 See LAFAVE, supra note 271, at 350.
274 sec e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 367-70 (2001) (dis-
cussing expansion of this doctrine in California judicial opinions and in the enactment of
the Model Penal Code).
275 See People v. White, 172 Cal. Rpm. 612, 615 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 404-05 (1993).
278 After John Hinckley was acquitted of the attempted murder of President Reagan
for reasons of insanity, Congress passed a statute that returned federal cowls to something
akin to the M'Naugh ten Rule. FRIEDNIAN, SUP117 note 275, at 405; see 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2000),
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however: the Bankruptcy Reform Act. of 1978 was passed in the same
year as the homicide in the Twinkle case. 277
Regardless of whether these changes are related to the creation
of the superdischarge, other forms of insurance continue to refuse to
shield individuals from the consequences of their willful misbehav-
ior,278
 and therefore the superdischarge remains an anomaly. Courts
have reacted to this anomaly by turning to another section of the
code, the requirement that a plan be proposed in good faith, 279 to
limit the availability of the superdischarge.
A minority of courts have refused to use this good faith test to
question the debtor's pre-petition conduct, 280
 either because they be-
lieve that Congress intended a narrow definition of good faith, 281 or
that the debtor is merely making use of a statutory right. 282 A
significant majority of courts, however, read good faith more broadly
and will consider the nature of the debt sought to be discharged. 288
277 See White, 172 Cal. Rpt•. at 613.
278 See supra notes 142-148 and accompanying text.
279
 See 11	 § 1325(a) (3) (2000).
289 See, e.g., Beach v. Boyajian, 243 B.R. 851, 857, 868 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000); In re Gath-
right, 67 B.R. 384, 385 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986). But see In re Scotten, 281 B.R. 147, 149
(Bankr. D. Mass, 2002) (considering pre-petition conduct to determine good-faith despite
Keach's lack of consideration of such a factor).
"1
 These courts reason that because courts did not look to the debtor's pre-filing con-
duct when applying the good faith standard in Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act of
1898, modern courts should not look to pre-filing conduct when applying the same good
faith standard in Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., Beach, 243 B.R. at 868-71.
Chapter XIII did not offer a superdischarge, however, so courts were generally not con-
fronted with plans that sought to discharge debts arising out of willful misconduct. See
supra note 247 and accompanying text. Moreover, even if a debtor did file a plan that
sought to discharge such a debt, the creditor consent requirements of Chapter XIII meant
that the plan would almost invariably propose to pay all debts, including unsecured debts,
in full. See supra note 202.
282
 See, e.g., Kettelt, 243 B.R. at 868 ("The contrary view of good faith, so prevalent in the
case law, is blatantly inconsistent with a debtor's clear statutory rights."). Furthermore
commentators sometimes suggest that the plaits meaning of § 1325(a) (3) precludes the
consideration of pre-petition conduct because it only requires that the plan be proposed
good faith. See, e.g., 3 KEITH M. LUNDIN, CHAPTER 13 BANRku•rcv § 180.1, at 180-89 (3rd
ed. 2000) ("It is more difficult to explain that distant debtor conduct—for example, at the
time of incurring a debt months or years before bankruptcy—illuminates the debtor's
good faith in proposing the plan."); Bradley M. Elbein, The Hole in the Code: Good Faith and
Morality in Chapter 13, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 439, 456 (1997) ("The explicit terms of
§ 1325(a) (3) require only an evaluation of good faith in the proposal of the plan ...." De-
spite the plain meaning of the statute, only a minority of courts apply § 1325(a) (3) as writ-
ten.).
289
 See, e.g., In Iv Day, 1999 WL at *4; Gier v. Farmers State Bank of Lucas, 986 F.2d
1326, 1328-29 (10th Cir. 1993); Robinson v. Tenantry, 987 F.2d 665, 668 n.6 (10th Cir.
1993); Slattetogrrn, 979 F.2t1 at 77; Leillaim, 898 F.2d at 1349; 3 LutainN, supra note 282, at
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Generally, the courts that use the good faith standard to police pre-
petition willful misconduct do not flatly deny access to the superdis-
charge. Rather, consistent with the public policy goal of retaining
adequate deterrence, these courts sometimes will grant a discharge of
debts arising from willful misconduct, but only after the debtor has
shown that he has received significant punishment. for his actions or is
sufficiently remorseful.24 Perhaps this inquiry into the debtor's par-
ticular circumstances provides an explanation for why the superdis-
charge protects bankrupt debtors from the consequences of their will-
ful misconduct while other insurance policies may not. While tort
liability plays an important role in deterring willful misconduct, soci-
ety also relies on other tools for deterrence, such as criminal liability.
Because bankruptcy is a judicial process, a judge can review the
debtor's circumstances and determine if the debtor has received
enough punishment from other sources to satisfy the need for deter-
rence.
In conducting the good faith analysis, however, courts do not just
focus on the punishment the debtor has received; they consider the
nature of the victim and the financial impact that the plan would have
on the victim. 285 Consequently, debtors guilty of severe pre-petition
misconduct may be forced to make a greater effort at repayment than
would other debtors.286
180-89 ("The courts persist in finding relevance to good faith in [pre-petition] debtor
conduct without finer distinctions. The reported decisions bucking this (illogical) trend
can be counted on few fingers,").
28' See, e.g., In tv Anadell, 190 B.R. 309, 310, 312 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995) (citing the
fact that attorney debtor had lost his law license and was incarcerated in deciding to ap-
prove plan paying approximately 10% of judgment for misappropriation of funds); In to
Corino, 191 B.R. 283, 290-91 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995) ("As a consequence for embezzling
funds from [the bank], Debtor has already served titne in prison, has forfeited a savings
account and since 1989 has paid [the bank] approximately $6,500 pursuant to varies wage
garnishment orders.... Debtor not only appeared repentant, but her efforts in negotia-
tion and her proposal to pledge all of her disposable income to a five year plan demon-
strates a willingness to pay her debt ....").
216 See, e.g., In re Sitarz, 150 B.R. 710, 722-23 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993) ("The identity of
the creditor, whether institutional or individual, is certainly relevant. The personal impact
of the debtor's conduct on an individual creditor, both at the time of the infliction of the
injury and in its future, is also significant.... The extent to which the debtor's payment
proposal would make the objecting creditor financially whole is another factor for consid-
eration.").
286 SCC 3 LUNDIN, supra note 282, at § 184.1, 184-7 ("In anticipation of a good-faith ob-
jection to confirmation, the debtor guilty of pre-petition criminal misconduct should con-
sider a five-year plan that maximizes payment to the victim.").
2002]	 Optimal Bankruptcy in a No ►-Optimal World	 55
Because this Article focuses on the standard consumer lending
transaction, it largely ignores the interests of the creditor. In the stan-
dard consumer lending transaction, this approach is justified because,
in the long run, the debtor largely bears the cost of bankruptcy in the
form of higher interest rates and reduced access to credit. 287 This
analysis, however, obviously does not apply to the tort. victim. To the
extent that bankruptcy law discharges judgments for torts, it truly
shifts the loss from tortfeasors to tort victims. In addition, tort victims
are poorly situated to bear this risk as they cannot easily diversify it
away like the consumer lender can. In short, the tort victim is a very
poor insurer of the tortfeasor and a rational bankruptcy policy must
balance the interests of both creditor and debtor. 289
C. Bankruptcy and the Opossum Problem: Assessing the Debtor's
Ability to Pay
Even if society decides that an individual deserves some relief, it
still must determine how much relief is appropriate. Ideally, bank-
ruptcy would only grant the debtor as much relief as he needs and
require the debtor to repay an amount. commensurate with his ability
to pay. To the extent. that one's ability to pay is related to his earning
ability, Chapter 7 fails to accomplish this task. While many debtors
repay some amount in Chapter 7, this amount is not based on in-
come. Rather, a tiny minority of debtors repay unsecured creditors
out. of their non-exempt assets, and a larger number of debtors
reaffirm secured loans. 289
 Chapter 7 may still play a rote in an optimal
bankruptcy system if restricted to debtors whose incomes are so low
that a court would have them repay nothing in bankru ptcy. 290
 Perhaps
287 Sec Pepin notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
288
 Perhaps this need to consider the creditor's interest explains why Congress chose to
offer the superdischarge only to those debtors who complete a Chapter 13 plan; the super-
discharge is unavailable to debtors who receive a hardship-discharge in Chapter 13. Scc 11
U.S.C. §1328(a)—(c) (2000) (applying to hardship discharges granted pursuant to
§ 1328(b)). Of course, the inability of a tort victim to easily absorb the loss makes the dis-
charge of other tort judgments problematic as well.
288 See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
288
 See supra note 92 and accompanying text; see also Braucher, supra note 13, at 13
("The premise that supports our current system is that the overwhelming majority of peo-
ple who file in Chapter 7 do not have enough to repay much of anything ...."), Chapter 7
may also play a role if it is too costly for judges to collect any information about debtors. In
this case, society may wish to rely on punishment to deter the debtor from falsely claiming
a need for relief. See Rea, supra note 7, at 196, 206. Chapter 7 may embody this punish-
ment-based approach to bankruptcy through the loss of collateral and the harm to the
56	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 44:1
this is why much of the current policy debate over means testing fo-
cuses on whether a debtor can repay his debts. 291 This section focuses,
however, on those debtors who should repay something in bankruptcy
and asks how bankruptcy should collect this amount.
Recall from Part 11 that the utopian bankruptcy system leaves the
debtor with some debts that he must repay, but reduces these debts to
an amount commensurate with his potential earnings. 292 Recall too
that the pessimist rejects the underlying assumption of utopian bank-
ruptcy—that judges can estimate a debtor's potential earnings—ancl
therefore insists that society should adopt a second-best bankruptcy
system that bases the debtor's required repayment on his actual earn-
ings. 293
This tension between the utopian and pessimistic views of bank-
ruptcy is reflected in the cases arising under Chapter 13. The lan-
guage of the Bankruptcy Code invokes the utopian bankruptcy system
in that it bases the debtor's required repayment on his estimated or
projected earnings. 294 Many courts, however, are skeptical of their
own ability to estimate a debtor's future income and therefore seek to
create a system that bases the debtor's repayment at least in part on
his actual earnings. In order to do so, some courts are willing to
significantly stray from the plain meaning of § 1325(b). This ap-
proach is unfortunate because these courts could better account for
their own limitations through other provisions of the cocle. 295 For in-
stance, if judges are concerned that their estimates may; on occasion,
significantly understate the debtor's actual earnings, then they can
order the debtor to report her income to the bankruptcy trustee and
rely on the interested parties to seek a modification of the plan. 290
Likewise, if judges believe that the debtor's income is simply too un-
certain to estimate, they should dismiss the debtor's bankruptcy peti-
tion on the grounds that the debtor lacks a regular income and there-
fore is not eligible for relief under Chapter 13. 297
debtor's credit reputation. Whether the punishment delivered by Chapter 7 could be bet-
ter designed is left to a future paper.
291 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
292 Sa supra notes 110-114 and accompanying text.
292 See supra notes 149-150 and accompanying text.
294 See 11 U S.C.§ 1325(b) (2000).
295 Sec infra notes 296-297 and accompanying text.
296 See 11 U.S.C. g 1329.
297 See id. § 109(e).
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1. Projected Disposable Income
Academics sometimes criticize Chapter 13 for discouraging debt-
ors from working by depriving them of any earnings above some fixed
amount. 298
 If Chapter 13 seized all of the debtors' disposable income,
or all of their actual income above some allowance for what the court
determines are their reasonably necessary expenses, then this would
be true. Such a system would effectively operate as a prohibitive tax
on any income earned above the fixed amount, and the debtor would
have no incentive to work any more than required to earn that fixed
amount. To the extent that a Chapter 13 bankruptcy emulates the
utopian bankruptcy system by leaving debtors with a fixed or lump-
sum obligation based on their projected earnings, however, it does not
discourage them from working at al1. 299
By its terms, the "disposable income" test of § 1325(b) does not
base a debtor's required repayments on her actual disposable in-
come."° Like the first-best tax or the utopian bankruptcy system,
§ 1325(b) bases the debtor's required repayment on her estimated or
projected disposable income; § 1325(b) requires the debtor to propose
a plan in which she uses all of her projected disposable incotne to repay
her debts.m A plain reading of this section requires the judge to proj-
ect the debtor's income at the time of confirmation and set the
debtor's repayment obligations equal to the amount by which ibis
projected income exceeds the debtor's reasonably necessary ex-
penses. 302
 A plain reading of this statute requires the judge to invoke
the utopian bankruptcy system.
Some courts follow the plain meaning of this section. In 1994, in
In re Anderson, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit over-
ruled the district. and bankruptcy courts' finding that the debtor
failed to meet the requirements of § 1325(b) (1) (b) because the debt,
or refused to sign a best. efforts certification that would in effect. bind
him to pay all of his actual disposable income to his creditors.30 Rely-
ing in part on the language of the statute,"4
 the court held that
298 See. e.g., LoPucki, supra note 23, at 471.
299 See supra notes 95-126 and accompanying text.
so)
 Ste 11 U .S.C.§ 1325(b).
" See id. § 1325(b) (1) (b) (emphasis added).
so See id. § 1325(b).
so 21 F.3cl 355,356-57 (9111 Cir. 1994).
so4 Id. at 357-58. The court also relied on the ability of the trustee to modify a plan
pursuant to § 1329 if the debtor's circumstances substantially improved. See id. at 358. As
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§ 1325(b) (1) (b) requires only that debtors pledge payment of all of
their projected, rather than actual, disposable income, and that there-
fore trustees may not require debtors to sign best efforts
certifications. 305
Although some jurisdictions have followed Anderson, 3" a few
courts have required debtors to promise a repayment contingent on
their actual income. 307 Unfortunately; the reasoning employed by
these courts is not always clear. At least one court that required a
debtor to sign a best efforts certification simply ignored the word
"projected,"°8 as did another court that required debtors to increase
plan payments whenever they were able to secure additional overtime
work or when they actually received benefits from a profit sharing
plan. 30° Another court required the debtor to pay an amount equal to
his projected disposable income plus half of any amount by which his
actual disposable income exceeded his projected disposable in-
come.814 Although this court explained that § 1325(13)(1) (b) did not
require a debtor to pay all of his actual disposable income, 311 it did
not explain why the debtor's actual disposable income was relevant at
al1. 812
discussed below, this is an example of the "guardedly optimistic" approach to bankruptcy.
See infra notes 334-369 and accompanying text.
3°3 See In rc Anderson, 21 F.3d at 357-58.
306 See, e.g., In re Bass, 267 B.R. 812, 819 (Bankr. S,D. Ohio 2001); In rc Jobe, 197 B,R.
823, 826 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996).
307 See infra notes 308-312 and accompanying text.
3°B See In re Akin, 54 B.R. 700, 702-03 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1985) ("The recent amendments
to the Bankruptcy Code require that all of the debtor's disposable income to be received
in the three-year period beginning on the date that the first payment is due under the plan
will be applied to make payments under the plan."); see also In re Fitak, 121 B.R. 224, 228-
29 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990) (stating in dicta, "(Obis court takes note that had Creditors
filed an objection to the Second Amended Plan as confirmed, the Debtors would have
been required under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) to automatically submit all disposable income to
the Trustee over the course of the next three years."). A later decision of the Bankruptcy
Court of the Southern District of Ohio, In re Bass, adopted the In re Anderson approach and
thus limited the precedential value of In re Fitak. Sec In re Bass, 267 B.R. at 819.
369 Sec In re Smith, 222 B.R. 846, 858, 860 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1998).
310 See In re Krull. 54 B.R. 375, 378 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985). This approach was later fol-
lowed in In re Riggleman, 76 B.R. 111, 114 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987) (quoting In re Krill!, 54
B.R. at 378). As noted above, however, the Southern District of Ohio has since followed the
approach of In re Anderson. See In re Bass, 267 B.R. at 819. Note that this effectively creates a
50% marginal income tax rate on top of whatever other taxes the debtor is paying.
311 See In re Trill, 54 B.R. at 378.
312 One suspects that the court relied on the good faith provision of 11 U.S.C. §
1325 (a) (3).
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Much more perplexing are the decisions within the Ninth Circuit
that have, subsequent to Anderson, required debtors to include a dis-
posable income clause in their plan. 313 A disposable income clause
appears to be functionally equivalent to a best efforts certification in
that debtors promise to repay with all of their actual disposable in-
come.314 In the 2001 decision In. to James, the Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Idaho explicitly acknowledged the binding precedent
in Anderson, yet still based its denial of confirmation in part on the
debtor's failure to include a disposable income clause in his plan.3 t 5
Given the abundant evidence that the debtor's plan was not proposed
in good faith,316
 one would like to assume that the court's insistence
on a disposable income clause was merely an isolated occurrence of
harmless error. Unfortunately, this does not appear to be the case.
The James court references other bankruptcy court decisions within
the Ninth Circuit that ignore the binding precedent in the jurisdic-
tion, including a decision by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the
Ninth Circuit that states, in dicta, that a disposable income clause is
required whenever a trustee or die holder of an unsecured claim ob-
jects to the plan. 317
 Moreover, one case cited suggests that, at least in
313 Sec supra notes 304-309 and accompanying text.
3" In theory, a disposable income clause could be little more than a statement that the
plan complies with the "projected disposable income" test and thus does not necessarily
mean that the debtor has pledged to repay with all of his or her actual disposable income.
Nevertheless, this is not the meaning ascribed by some courts that require debtors to in-
clude such clauses as a condition of confirmation. According to these courts, the purpose
of such a clause is to allow the unsecured creditors to benefit from any increase in the
debtor's actual income. See, e.g., In re James, 260 B.R. 498, 514 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2001)
("The purpose of including a disposable income clause is to allow unsecured creditors to
share in the debtor's post-confirmation improvement in circumstances.") (citing J.R. Hol-
lister Co. v. Jackson, 95 I.B.C.R. 183, 185 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1995)); see also In re Wages, 92
I.B.C.R. 75, 78 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1992) (stating that a disposable income clause mandates
the debtor to consult with the Trustee regarding any available funds). But see Max Recov-
ery, Inc. v. Titan, 215 B.R. 430, 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997) ("The plan did not contain a
'best efforts' or 'disposable income' provision stating that all of debtor's projected dispos-
able income ... would be applied to the plan payments.") (emphasis added).
313
 See In re jallICS, 260 B.R. at 513-14.
313
 Among other things, the court found that the debtor failed to disclose assets, al-
lowed the claim of a very large debt to a family member that conflicted with statements
that the debtor made to the Internal Revenue Service, attempted to give preferential
treatment to certain creditors, attempted to discharge large court fines for discovery abuse
in litigation against one of his major creditors, and attempted to discharge the claims of
his ex-wife who had a substantially lower income than he did. Id. at 505-12.
317 See Tban, 215 B.R. at 432 ("Such [a] provision [a disposable income clause] is re-
quired following an objection to plan confirmation by §1325(b) ...."); Jackson, 95
I.B.C.R. at 185 ("Section 1325(b) (1) makes it clear that such a requirement [a disposable
income clause] need only be included as a condition of plan confirmation 'MI' the trustee
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Idaho, debtors are routinely forced to include such clauses in their
plans.3 t 8 One suspects that even if these plans are not required for
confirmation, many debtors may simply agree to their inclusion to
prevent the trustee from invoking a host of objections. 3 t 9
Some of the courts that require disposable income clauses try to
distinguish their facts from those of Anderson by stating that such a
clause is only required when a trustee or a creditor objects to a
plan.32° This distinction, however, clearly fails because the trustee ob-
jected in Anderson as wel1;321 the requirement of a trustee or creditor
objection determines whether § 1325(b) applies at all, not whether
projected or actual disposable income must be promised.322 Jackson,
one of the decisions cited by James, recognizes the futility of trying to
distinguish Anderson and claims that the law on this point is unclear. 323
While this may be true generally, this is not true within the Ninth Cir-
cuit, where Anderson should serve as binding precedent for lower
courts. 324
What is consistent in each of the decisions that base debtors' re-
quired repayment on their actual income is a pessimism about the
judge's ability to accurately estimate debtors' earnings. This pessi-
mism has caused judges to ignore the plain meaning of the statute
and, in the case of the bankruptcy courts within the Ninth Circuit, the
binding precedent in their jurisdiction as well. The judges in these
cases almost invariably express frustration at their inability to accu-
rately forecast debtors' earnings. For example, the court may believe
that the debtor may earn future promotions or raises or may be able
or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to confirmation	 (alteration in
original).
318
 Jackson, 95 I.B.C.R. at 185 ("Disposable income clauses are routinely included in
plans confirmed in this District, probably not because debtors find such a requirement
attractive, but rather, the Court suspects, because the standing Chapter 13 trustees in
Idaho usually object to confirmation of any plan that does not include such a clause. While
the law on this point is somewhat unclear, the Court has sustained such objections • ...")
(citation omitted).
319 See id.
320 See, e.g., Than, 215 B.R. at 432 ("Such [al provision [a disposable income clause]
need only be included as a condition of confirmation '[i[f the trustee or the holder of an
allowed unsecured claim objects to confirmation ....'").
321 See In re Anderson, 21 F.3d at 356-57.
322 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2000) (beginning, "[Of the trustee or the holder of an al-
lowed unsecured claim object . • ..").
923 See Jackson, 95 I.B.C.R. at 185. As contrary precedent this court cites a bankruptcy
case from the District of Idaho that predates In re Anderson. See id. (citing In re Wages, 92
I.C.B.R. at 78).
324 See supra notes 314-319 and accompanying text.
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to work additional overtime. 325
 The clearest expression of this pessi-
mism can be found, however, in the context. of the recently extended
Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code, "Adjustment of Debts of a Family
Farmer With Regular Annual Income." 526
 Chapter 12 contained a pro-
jected disposable income test that, for the purposes of this Article, is
worded identically to § 1325(b).327 In 1994, in Rowley v. Yarnall, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit noted that the plain
meaning of the statute required it to base the debtor's repayment only
on the debtor's projected income, yet chose to ignore the word "pro-
jected" in the statute." 8
 It did so because it feared that the debtor
would merely predict that disposable income will be zero, and thus
render the entire disposable income test meaningless. 329 Effectively,
the court feared that. it. would be unable to project debtors' income
and that therefore debtors would have an incentive to "play 'possum"
and grossly understate their future income 3 5°
To the extent one shares the skepticism of these courts in their
ability to estimate a debtor's future income, one would reject a debt-
adjustment bankruptcy system as doomed to failure. This, however,
does not justify an interpretation that ignores the plain Meaning of
§ 1325(b). Courts can address their concerns by adopting readings of
other sections dial do less violence to the plain meaning of the Bank-
ruptcy Code."' If a court believes that it can provide a fairly good es-
timate of the debtor's earnings, but that there is some risk of a big
328
 See, e.g., In r c James, 260 B.R. at 515 ("And in any event, the Court cannot clearly
foresee when or in what amounts Debtor's income and billable hours would increase if his
plan were confirmed."); In re Smith, 222 B.R. at 858, 860 (requiring debtors to submit peri-
odic financial reports and use any actual income above projected income to repay credi-
tors because debtors had previously worked a significant amount of overtime hours and
received distributions from a profit sharing plan); In re Akin, 54 B.R. at 703 ("Mt appears
that the debtor's employment history and ability to earn and likelihood of future increase
in income is such that there will be increases in income which will be available for addl.
tional payments."); In iv Kruk 54 B.R. at 377 ("Thus there is a good chance that his earn-
ings will increase as he gains on-the-job experience, yet the proposed plan makes no provi-
sion for future increases.").
328
 Congress just passed an extension of Chapter 12. See Act of Dec. 19, 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-377, 116 Stat. 3115 (extending Chapter 12 until June 30, 2003).
327
 11 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (2000) (Section 1225(b) contains language not found in
§ 1325(b) allowing the court to extend the three—year payment period under § 1222(c),
and § 1325(h) contains language not found in § 1225(b) excluding charitable contribu-
tions front disposable income.)
328
 22 F.3d 190, 192 (8th Cir. 1994).
328 See id.
338 See id.
331 Sec infm notes 332-333 and accompanying text.
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change in the debtor's circumstances, it can rely on future
modifications to account for this problem. 332 If the court truly believes
that it does not have a sufficient basis to estimate the debtor's future
income, then it should dismiss the Chapter 13 filing due to a lack of
regular inconie. 333
2. Plan Modifications
Even the guarded optimist of Part II does not believe that judges
are omniscient and therefore rejects the utopian approach of basing
the debtor's required repayment solely on projected income. Just be-
cause judges are not omniscient, however, does not mean that they
have no ability to project the debtor's income. Rather, one might rea-
sonably believe that judges can often use the debtor's past income to
provide a fairly good estimate of the debtor's future income, but that
on occasion this estimate will prove fairly inaccurate. As discussed in
Part II, this greater confidence in the ability of judges leads one to
advocate an intermediate approach between the utopian bankruptcy
system that adjusts the amount of an individual's debts based on pro-
jected income and the pessimist's bankruptcy system that is effectively
a tax on actual income. The optimist's bankruptcy system adjusts
debts based on the debtor's projected income but then adjusts these
debts again when the debtor's actual income deviates drastically from
the projected amount:334 This is at least a partial description of the
approach that Chapter 13 actually takes. To understand how bank-
ruptcy reacts to a drastic change in debtors' financial condition, it is
best to separate an improvement in debtors' condition from a dete-
rioration in their condition.
a. Sharp Decline in Financial Condition
The extremely low completion rate of Chapter 13 bankruptcies"'
suggests that judges often overestimate debtors' ability to pay. 336 A fall
332 See infra notes 334-369 and accompanying text.
333 Sec infra notes 371-406 and accompanying text.
334 See supra notes 157-162 and accompanying text.
335 See, e.g., SULLIVAN El' AL., supra note 5, at 215-17 (finding a two-thirds failure rate
for Chapter 13 cases); see alsoJean Braucher, An Empirical Study of Debtor Education in Bank-
ruptcy Impact on Chapter 13 Completion Not Shown, 9 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 557, 557
(2001) (finding that a majority of plans in sample were not completed); Marjorie L. Girth,
The Role of Empirical Data in Developing Bankruptcy Legislation for Individuals, 65 No. U. 17,
40-42 (1989) (finding completion rate of 63% in sample of post-confirmation Chapter 13
cases in Buffalo, N.1:); Scott F. Not-berg, Consumer Bankruptcy's New Clothes: An Empirical
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in debtors' ability to pay, however, does not necessarily result. in a
failed Chapter 13 bankruptcy. If debtors' actual income falls sharply
below the projected amount, debtors may seek a modification to re-
duce their required repayment.3g7
 or, in an extreme case, may seek a
hardship discharge. 338
The prospect of post-petition relief creates a further grasshopper
problem: to the extent that bankruptcy insulates debtors against an
additional fall in their earning ability, they have less incentive to work
hard. Because of this, some have argued that courts should not grant.
a modification when the decline in the debtor's financial condition is
due to the debtor's own actions. 339
 This, however, is just the utopian
solution to the grasshopper problem that is generally rejected both
inside and outside of bankruptcy due to a concern that judges will be
unable to distinguish those who deserve relief from those who do
not, 340
Though few, if any, reported cases deny relief to debtors on the
grounds that they caused their own financial distress, the high failure
rate of Chapter 13 plans suggests that this may occur in practice or
that debtors sometimes find it too costly to seek a modification. This
does not mean, however, that debtors receive no relief for the subse-
quent shock that they endure. That. is, Chapter 13 does not require
debtors to make the payments under their plan. Debtors may be able
to reduce their required repayment without obtaining judicial ap-
proval by converting their filing to Chapter 7541
 or by simply dismiss-
ing their case342
 and relying on non-bankruptcy protections.
Study of Discharge and Debt Collection in Chapter 13, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. ityv. 415, 440
(1999) (finding completion rate in one district in Mississippi of 32%); Whitford, supra
note 203, at 411 tb1.2 (finding that only 31% of Chapter 13 cases in study closed as com-
pleted).
336
 For confirmation, a judge must find that the debtor is likely to be able to complete
his plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (6) (2000). Judges, however, may not be responsible for a
significant portion of the failure rate, A large number of debtors may file under Chapter
13 solely to obtain temporary relief through the automatic stay and may have no intention
of completing a plan. See, e.g.. Warren, supra note 14, at 502 ("The Commission received a
great cleat of testimony from debtors' attorneys asserting that many people do not file for
Chapter 13 in order to receive a discharge; they file only for the automatic stay.").
" 7 Scc I 1 U.S.C. § 1329.
338 See id. § 1328(b)(1).
999 Sec Gross, supra note 102, at 146.
91° See supra notes 127-131 and accompanying text.
Sec 11 U.S.C. § 1307(a), (e).
342 See id. § 1307(b).
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b. Shaip Improvement in Financial Condition
Perhaps more interesting is the fact that § 1329 explicitly allows
the Chapter 13 trustee or an unsecured creditor to seek a
modification to increase the debtor's required repayments. 313 Al-
though the mechanics of the Bankruptcy Code do not work well in
this context, most courts are willing to play an interstitial role and al-
low for modifications that increase the required payments even when
the standards to be applied are unclear at best. 344 They are willing to
do so because even those courts that follow the plain meaning of pro-
jected disposable income are at best guarded optimists.
Congress amended § 1329 to allow creditors to share in the im-
provement of the debtor's circumstances, 345 but provided no standard
for determining the amount by which the repayments should in-
crease. Though § 1329 has occasionally been used to force debtors to
pay following an appreciation in their assets,346 this Article focuses on
the debtor's income. When assessing how much of the increased in-
come the debtor must pay to the creditor, the natural measure is the
projected disposable income test of § 1325(b). it is not at all clear,
however, whether the projected disposable income test applies to a
proposed modification. For example, though § 1329 specifically ref-
erences four code sections that apply to modifications, including
§ 1325(a), it does not directly mention the disposable income test of
§ 1325(b).347 Some courts have therefore held that the disposable in-
343 Id. § 1329(a) (1).
544 See infra notes 351-352 and accompanying text.
545 See Oversight Hearings on Pen, Bankr. Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies 49' Commercial
Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 215, 221 (1984) (statement of Hon.
Conrad Cyr, Bankr. J. for the Dist. of Me., on behalf of the Nat'l Bankr. Conf. and the Nat'l
Conf. of Bankr. Judges); 14 MARK BANE ET AL., supra note 180, at 1 1329.03 ("This
amendment is intended to carry the ability-to-pay standard forward to any modifications of
the plan, allowing upward or downward adjustment of plan payments in response to
changes in the debtor's circumstances that substantially affect the ability to make future
payments.").
s48 few courts would apply the best interests of the creditors test of § 1325(a) (4) to
capture appreciation of the debtor's assets beyond the relevant exemptions. See, e.g., In re
Barbosa, 236 B.R. 540, 554, 556 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999) (applying the best interests of the
creditors test as of the date of the modification), aff'd on other grounds, sub 110111., Barbosa r.
Solomon, 243 B.R. 562 (D. Mass. 2000), aff'd 235 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2000). But see Forbes v.
Forbes, 215 B.R. 183, 189-90 (BAP. 8th Cir. 1997) (refusing to apply the best interests of
the creditors test as of the date of the requested modification). For a general discussion of
this issue, see 3 LUNDIN, supra note 282, § 254.1.
947 SCC 11 U.S.C. § 1329.
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come test. does not apply to modifications. 348
 Even if one does apply
§ 1325(b) to a proposed modification, there are further complica-
tions. 519
 The most significant. among these is that § 1325(b) is re-
stricted to projected disposable income and therefore arguably
should not capture unexpected increases in the debtor's actual in-
come.3"
Despite these problems, most courts are generally willing to use
the projected disposable income test to allow creditors to capture
some of the benefits of an unanticipated increase in the debtor's
financial circumstances. 351 Moreover, even some of the courts that. re-
ject the use of the disposable income test in the modification context.
would still allow a bankruptcy court to consider an increase in the
debtor's income when ruling on a creditor's requested modification
to increase payments under a plan. 352
This willingness to modify plans erodes the importance of the
distinction between projected disposable income and actual disposable
income. As one bankruptcy judge and commentator put it, TN
948 See, e.g., In re Moss, 91 B.R. 563, 566 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988); accord Forbes, 215 B.R.
at 191; In re Coleman, 231 B.R. 397, 401 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1999); In re Anderson, 153 B.R.
527, 528-29 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1993). Section 1325(a) itself references § 1325(b), how-
ever, and therefore the disposable income test is arguably incorporated indirectly into
§ 1329. This argument is complicated by the fact that such logic results in redundancy, as
one of the cross-references, § 1325(a) (1), references all "provisions of this chapter" and
therefore includes the sections that § 1329 explicitly references. See 3 LUNDIN, supra note
282, § 255.1, at 255-1 to 255-4. A second problem is that, by its terms, the disposable in-
come test only applies upon the objection of the trustee or an unsecured creditor and at
least one court has therefore held that the disposable income test cannot apply unless the
creditor or the trustee objected to the original plan. See, e.g., Than, 215 B.R. at 437. One
might instead read § 132500 requirement of an objection to the confirmation of the
plan to refer to the modification, but this creates its own difficulties. If the trustee or an
unsecured creditor is moving to increase payments under the plan, then it will be the
debtoriAlto is objecting and therefore the requirements of § 1325 (b) are not met.
343
 Some of the questions are more mechanical in nature, such as whether the th•ee-
year period of the disposable income test should be measured from the beginning of the
plan or from the time of modification. Sec 3 LuNnix, supra note 282, § 255.1, at 255-7 to
255-9.
35° See id. § 255.1, at 255-6 to 255-7.
351
	 e.g., In m Freeman, 86 F.3d 478, 481 (6th Cir. 1996); In re Martin, 232 B.R. 29, 37
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1999); In re Studer, 237 B.R. 189, 193 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998); 3 LUNDIN,
supra note 282, § 255.1, at 255-2 ("A majority of the reported decisions apply the dispos-
able income test at modification of a confirmed plan, though many do so without com-
ment or analysis.").
352 In ,r Than, 215 B.R. at 436 ("Although we hold herein that § 1325(b) does not ap-
ply to this plan modification, we also remand with instructions that the bankruptcy court
consider the Powers standard, along with factors affecting modification expressedly or im-
pliedly raised by the pleadings. Some factors might include: I) Than's increased income, if
any, due to the changed circumstances and any change in his expenses ....").
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§ 1325(b) is applied at modification after confirmation, the result re-
fused in Anderson comes in through the back door . "3" Because
judges are not omniscient, however, this ability to modify a plan when
a projection of income proves drastically wrong is central to the
justification for initially basing debtors' required repayment on their
projected income. In fact, Anderson, the leading case holding that the
projected disposable income test of § 1325(b) does not require debt-
ors to promise to repay with all of their actual disposable income,
based its holding in large part on the ability of creditors to seek a sub-
sequent modification should the debtors' circumstances improve . 354
Before one decries Chapter 13 for capturing debtors' actual in-
come and thereby removing their incentive to work, one should note
the general lack of reported cases in which courts increase debtors'
required payments in response to an increase in debtors' earned in-
come.355 In addition, most, if not all, of the reported cases in this
category involve a drastic increase in income caused at least in part by
circumstances beyond the debtor's control. 356 In Arnold,357 the court
modified the plan payments after the debtor, a paper product sales-
man, had an increase in income of over 150%.358 While salespeople
are compensated through commissions precisely because their own
efforts are important in generating sales, larger economic forces and
corporate decisions play a strong role as well. In Louquet, 359 the court
modified the plan payments after the debtor, a self-employed insur-
353 3 LuNnIN, supra note 282, § 255A, at 255-7.
354 In re Anderson, 21 F.3d at 358 ("Under § 1329, the trustee may request modification
of the debtor's plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a). If the debtor or a creditor objects to the
modification, the trustee 'must bear the burden of showing a substantial change in the
debtor's ability to pay since the confirmation hearing and that the prospect of the change
had not already been taken into account at the time of confirmation.'").
355 Since 1984, debtors have filed over five million Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions. See
Am. Bankr. Inst., Annual Non-Business Bankruptcy Filings by Chapter, available at
http://www.abiworld.org/stats/bychapter.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2002). Though, ad-
mittedly not all cases are reported, a fairly diligent search in on-line databases revealed
only three reported cases of this type. See In re Arnold, 869 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1989); In rr
Lotiquet, 125 B.R. 267 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991); In re Powers, 202 B.R. 618, 618 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 1996).
356 Recall that under the utopian approach to modifications, judges would always
change the required repayment following a change in debtors' circumstances that was not
caused by their own efforts. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
357 869 F.2d at 240.
358 The debtor's income had increased from about $80,000 a year to about $200,000
per year. Id. at 241.
359 125 B.R. at 267.
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ance adjuster, had an increase in income of approximately 45%. 360 In
Powers,36 i the debtor, a card dealer, also had an increase in income of
about 45%, 362
 In addition, this income was reported only after her
employer adopted a tip-allocation method that made it much harder
to hide cash tips. 363
Still, because the income of these individuals also depended on
their own efforts, the possibility of a modification may discourage
similarly situated debtors from working to increase their income. Crit-
ics of Chapter 13 often point to the debate over the proper structure
of public assistance programs for the idea that the debtor must retain
some of the marginal dollar earned. 364 Economists have found, how-
ever, that critics of public assistance programs overstated the effective
tax rates these programs create by ignoring how they are actually im-
plemented. In calculating earnings to be counted against benefits,
welfare caseworkers generally deduct n umerous expenses, and errors
in favor of the beneficiary often creep into the calculations. 3°6 This
results in recipients being allowed to keep some of the additional dol-
lars earned. This effect is perhaps more pronounced in bankruptcy as
each of the above debtors retained at least half of the increase in his
earnings. In Louquel, the debtors' income grew by almost $1,000 per
mouth while the trustee only sought an increase in payments of $350
per month. 366 In Arnold, the debtor's monthly income increased by
over $10,000 and yet his payments were only increased by $700 per
month.367
 The debtor's gross income in Powers increased by approxi-
mately $1,000 per month but her payments increased by only $500
366 Id. at 268.
561 202 B.R. at 618.
362
 Id. at 620.
363
 The casino began pooling tips and distributing them based on the number of hours
worked; prior to this change the debtor had used the amount of tips assumed by the In-
ternal Revenue Service. Id.
3c4 Sec. e.g„ LoPucki, supra note 23, at 471.
365 Burtless, supra note 15, at 63. In addition, even if the programs do create a 100%
marginal tax rate, it is possible, as a matter of theory, that they increase the incentive to
work in the aggregate because they discourage some individuals from receiving public
assistance. Sec infra note 406 and accompanying text.
366 125 B.R. at 268.
367
 869 F.2d at 243 ("Arnold's arguments that the increased mulleins will discourage
him from working hard ring hollow in light of the fact that, although his monthly gross
income in December 1987 was nearly $10,000 higher than at the time of the Chapter 13
confirmation, the bankruptcy court increased his monthly payments only by $700 per
month. Even with the higher Chapter 13 payments, Arnold's hard work has paid off hand-
somely for him.").
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per month because she was able to claim an increase in her ex-
pe n se s. 368
Moreover, even if the increase in debtors' payments matches the
increase in debtors' income, debtors may still have an incentive to ex-
pend the effort necessary to increase their income. The reason for
this is outlined in Arnold; as long as the underlying cause of the in-
crease in income—say a promotion, a customer contact, or a raise—
has a continuing impact after the termination of the debtor's bank-
ruptcy plan, the threat of a modification would not capture all of the
debtor's benefit from this change. 389
3. The Regular Income Requirement and Non-Bankruptcy Law
A bankruptcy system that adjusts one's debts based on one's pro-
jected income would be administratively burdensome if modifications
were often necessary. Therefore, the appropriateness of this approach
depends on the ability of judges to forecast a debtor's earnings. To
estimate the debtor's income over the three years required by the pro-
jected disposable income test, 37° courts typically multiply the debtor's
current monthly income by thirty-six. 37 i
This estimation method would fare poorly if the debtor's income
varied significantly from month to month. Section 109 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, however, restricts access to Chapter 13 to an individual
with regular income. 372 If the regular income test limited Chapter 13
to those debtors with a fairly stable aggregate income, judges could
accurately estimate debtors' future income by using their past income.
One might therefore believe that an adjustment of debts approach to
bankruptcy would work quite well.
Unfortunately, one can interpret the phrase "an individual with
regular income" to mean an individual with some or sufficient regular
income rather than an individual with regular total income. To under-
stand the distinction, consider a salesperson who earns a salary of
56'3 202 B.R. at 623.
S69 In rr Arnold, 869 F.2d at 242-43.
379 1 I U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2000).
371 E.g., In re Solomon, 67 F.3d 1128, 1132 (4th Cir. 1995) ("Projected disposable in-
come typically is calculated by multiplying a debtor's monthly income at the time of
confirmation by 36 months ... ,"); In re Anderson, 21 F.3d at 357; In re Killotigla, 900 F.2d
61, 64 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (The task of estimating projected income "is usually
accomplished by multiplying the debtor's monthly income by 36.").
572 11 U.S.C. § 109(c). Chapter 12, an analogous provision for family farmers, is also
restricted to a "family farmer with regular annual income." Id. § 109(f).
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$20,000 per year and who earned no commissions in four of the five
previous years and commissions of $100,000 in the other year. While
this individual has some regular income, the aggregate amount. of his
income is not regular.
One can read § 109(e) to allow debtors with irregular total in-
come access to Chapter 13. 373
 The Bankruptcy Code defines "[an]
individual with regular income" to mean an "individual whose income
is sufficiently stable and regular to enable such individual to make pay-
ments under a plan under Chapter 13 of this title ."374
 Therefore, as
long as debtors have sufficient regular income to satisfy the various
repayment provisions of Chapter 13, they should be allowed to file in
Chapter 13. 375
Prior to the addition of the projected disposable income test,
judges had to determine that debtors would have sufficient income to
make their payments, 376
 but judges did not neecl to consider debtors'
income when determining how large those payments should be unless
they considered the debtor's income in their good faith analysis. 377
The best interests of the creditors test asks only if the unsecured
creditor would have received more in a Chapter 7 liquidation and
thus focuses only on debtors' non-exempt assets. 378
 A few courts did
consider debtors' income when deciding whether their plans are filed
in good faith, but others did not.. 379
 Therefore, in many jurisdictions
the minimum required repayment was effectively determined by the
value of the debtor's non-exempt assets, if any, 38° and the value of any
assets pledged by the debtor to secured creditors as collatera1. 381 This
allowed judges to adopt a broad interpretation of the term "regular
income." One court even ruled that a debtor had sufficiently regular
and stable income even though future income was not readily ascer-
tainable with any degree of certainty. 382
After the addition of the projected disposable income test, at
least one court has held that the debtor's income must be substan-
575 See infra note 374 and accompanying text.
U.S.C. § 101(30) (emphasis added).
576 See id.
576 See id. § 1325(a) (6).
' 77 See sepia notes 214-215 and accompanying text.
978 Id. § 1325(a) (4).
379 See supra.notes 214-215 and accompanying text.
38° SeellU.S.C.§ 1325 (a) (4).
38I See id. § 1325(a) (5).
552 In re Hines, 7 B.R. 415, 418 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1980) (rejecting trustee's claim that
farmer lacks regular income because his earnings are too speculative).
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Bally certain in amount and reasonably predictable. 383 Most courts,
however, continue to use an extremely broad definition of "regular
income," and their focus remains on whether the debtor is likely to
have the income necessary to make the payments called for under the
debtor's proposed p1an. 384 Some courts do deny debtors access to
Chapter 13 for lack of regular income, but these decisions usually in-
volve questions of whether debtors had any income at all because the
debtors were either tinemployed385 or dependent on the support of
friends or family386 to complete their plan. It. should be noted that
even these debtors are sometimes found to have regular income. 387
The addition of the projected disposable income test may make
such a broad interpretation of "regular income" inappropriate. As a
matter of policy, a debt-adjustment bankruptcy system requires that
judges be able to estimate the debtor's income and therefore requires
the debtor to have fairly stable income. One does not need to resort
to public policy arguments, however, to justify a change in the inter-
pretation of "regular income." One can argue that the language of
the Bankruptcy Code requires that judges dismiss plans filed by debtors
with uncertain aggregate income because these debtors will be unable
to "make payments under a plan under Chapter 13 ...."388
Consider how the projected disposable income test would apply
to our hypothetical salesperson. Assume that the judge believes that.
the salesperson's earnings history indicates that there is an 80%
chance that the salesperson will earn no commissions in a given year
and a 20% chance that the debtor will earn $100,000 in commissions.
Although courts typically just multiply the debtor's current monthly
income by thirty-six, this is only a presumptive guide and does not
preclude other estimation methods. 389 While judges should not in-
383
 In re Hickman, 104 B.R. 374, 376 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989).
ss4
 See, e.g., Irr le Murphy, 226 B.R. 601, 604-05 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1998) (discussing
precedent).
548 See In re Smith, 234 B.R. 852. 855 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1999); In re Crowder, 179 B.R.
571, 574 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1995).
388 See In re Jordan, 226 B.R. 117, 120 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1998) (debtor dependent on
support from live-in boyfriend); In re Hanlin, 211 B.R. 147, 148 (Bankr. W.D.N.1: 1997)
(unemployed debtor dependent on assistance front friends and family); In re Cregut, 69
B.R. 21, 22 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1986) (debtor dependent on monthly gift from parents).
387 See ha re illtopliy, 226 B.R. at 604 (debtor with written commitment front significant
other to make plan payments); In re Antoine, 208 B.R. 17, 20 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997) (un-
employed carpenter with oral commitment by his wife to support plan obligations).
388 11 U.S.C. § 101(30) (2000).
sag
	 e.g., In re Heath, 182 B.R. 557, 559 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) ("The Anderson opin-
ion does not appear to prohibit means other than the "monthly income times 36" test for
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elude the entire $100,000 connnission, 39° they should hot ignore the
prospect for earning this amount either. Financial analysts often value
corporations based on their projected income or projected cash
flow; 391
 in doing so they may discount uncertain earnings more heav-
ily, but they would not ignore them. A firm's, or an individual's, pro-
jected or expected earnings is simply the average amount that it can
earn. In the case of our salesperson, the projected income consists of
the $20,000 salary and an average commission of $20,000 (20% mul-
tiplied by $100,000). If our salesperson is asked to repay an amount.
based on a $40,000 projected income and the salesperson has at least
some reasonably necessary expenses, the salesperson will be unable to
make payments the 80% of the time when he earns only $20,000. This
would be true even if the court built in a small cushion for unex-
pected developments. 392 Because the salesperson lacks sufficient sta-
ble income to make the payments that are required based on his pro-
jected income, his filing should be dismissed.393
A debtor denied access to Chapter 13 effectively has two choices:
file under Chapter 7 or rely on non-bankruptcy law for protection.
calculating a debtor's projected disposable income, but it clearly requires that future in-
come be subject to some showing of projectability."); Iri re KUlough, 900 F.2d at 66 (per
curtain) (holding that while overtime pay should sometimes be included as projected in-
come. the potential for that debtor's overtime work was not definite enough to be in-
cluded its projected income).
39° Sec, e.g., Ethic. Assistance Corp. v, Zellner, 827 F.2d 1222, 1226 (8th Cir. 1987); 2
LuNniN, supra note 282. § 164.1, at 164-29 (reviewing cases and arguing that speculative
increases in income should not be included in projected income),
" 1 See, e.g., RICOARD A. BREAUX & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES or CORPORATE FI-
NANCE. 73-78 (5th ed. 1996).
s92 See, e.g., In re Fries, 68 B.R. 676, 683 n.7 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986): 2 LA/Num supra
note 282, § 164.1, at 164-29 (reviewing cases).
393
 Although this Article argues for a change in the way "regular income" is inter-
preted, the new interpretation urged is consistent with the relevant legislative history. For
example, in explaining that the "regular income test expands eligibility beyond wage-
earners," the Senate report states, "[Oise definition [of regular income] encompasses all
individuals with incomes that are sufficiently stable and regular to enable them to make
payments under a Chapter 13 plan. Thus, individuals on welfare, social security, fixed pen-
sion incomes, or who live on investment incomes, will be able to work out repayment plans
with their' creditors rather than being forced into straight bankruptcy. Also, self-employed
individuals will be eligible to use Chapter 13 if they have regular incomes." S. REP, No. 95-
989, at 24 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5809; see also H.R. RE:P. No. 95-595,
at 311-12 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6268-69. Each of the enumerated
individuals either receives an aggregate income stream that is fairly stable (welfare, social
security, fixed pension income) or their eligibility is contingent on their having "regular
income." Sec id. The one possible exception to this is the individual living on an investment
income. Sec id. Congress was likely alluding, however, to those individuals relying on a sta-
ble stream of dividends or interest payments rather than the modern day-trader. See id.
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First, consider how the debtor would be treated under non-
bankruptcy law. Creditors would be able to garnish the debtor's actual
income subject to state and federal limitations; 394 non-bankruptcy law
effectively taxes the debtor's actual income. Note that this is the sec-
ond-best bankruptcy system, or the optimal bankruptcy system when a
judge cannot estimate the debtor's potential or projected income. 395
Like all income taxes, garnishment may discourage the debtor
from working. The marginal rates created by garnishment law, how-
ever, are not unreasonably large by the standards of income taxation.
For example, a single debtor living in Virginia and earning $25,000 a
year has a marginal tax rate of approximately 25.7% once all state and
federal taxes are considered. 396 If the debtor's wages are garnished,
the total effective marginal rate will rise to approximately 44%. 397
While this rate is quite high, it is only slightly higher than the 43%
marginal rate that the debtor would pay without garnishment if the
debtor earned $300,000 per year, 398 and well below some historical
federal tax rates which have reached as high as 94%. 399 This compari-
son is not meant to imply that debtors in financial distress should pay
the same effective tax rate as the very wealthy; current garnishment
rates may be too high to allow low-income debtors to maintain a
sufficient standard of living. Rather, it is merely meant to show that
society is sometimes willing to accept the work disincentives associated
with high marginal rates in order to achieve other goals.
Of course, garnishment will have some effects that are not mar-
ginal in nature. The garnishment process may prove so administra-
tively burdensome to the debtor's employer that the employer may
decide to simply fire the debtor. If garnishment leaves the debtor with
too little take-home pay, the debtor may prefer to forego work alto-
gether. 40° Non-bankruptcy law, however, is designed to address these
394 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
394 See supra notes 149-150 and accompanying text.
396 This assumes that the individual must pay 7.65% in social security and medicare,
5% in Virginia state taxes and 15% in federal taxes on the amount remaining after the
other taxes are assessed.
397 Garnishment would seize an additional 25% of the debtor's after-tax income.
398 This assumes that the individual must pay 5% in Virginia state taxes and 39.7% in
federal taxes on the amount remaining after the state ta.xes are assessed. This individual
would face no marginal social security or medicare taxes because he will have exceeded
the maximum taxes.
399 Sec Cong. Joint Comm. on Taxation, History of Federal Individual Income Tax
Rates, availa6le at http://www.taxplanet.com/library/oldmrates/oldtaxrates.html#5  (last
accessed on Oct. 8, 2002).
-00 Sec jAcKsoN, supra note 8, at 244.
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non-marginal effects as well. For example, federal law now prohibits
terminations in response to a garnishment order, though some doubt.
the effectiveness of this prohibition.401 In addition, note that debtors
would only refuse to work if they have some other means of support
such as the assistance of family and friends or public assistance; debt,
ors would not choose to forego work if this meant. starvation. There-
fore, garnishment. must always leave the debtor with a sufficient
amount. so
 that the debtor would not prefer to rely on this outside
source of support. This problem is likely to be particularly severe for
the low-income debtor who may earn little more than is available
from public assistance or the non-market economy. Perhaps for this
reason federal garnishment law also prohibits garnishment. that would
leave the debtor with take-home pay less than thirty times the federal
minimum wage. 402
Unfortunately, simply dismissing Chapter 13 filings will not nec-
essarily lead to the optimal result. These dismissals may just result in
more Chapter 7 filings, and Chapter 7 ignores the debtor's income
entirely. Moreover, as a matter of theory, one cannot even conclude
that the current federal limitations of garnishment, which allow the
debtor to keep most of each additional dollar earned, offer debtors a
greater incentive to work than a system that seizes all of their actual
disposable income. To see why this is the case, it is necessary to return
to the literature on public assistance.
For years economists complained that public assistance programs
that. reduced a recipient's benefit with each additional dollar earned
effectively created a 100% tax rate and thereby discouraged the re-
cipient from working. 403
 The same could be said of a disposable in-
come clause as debtors are required to repay with any amount above
their reasonably necessary expenses. When economists actually stud-
ied how public assistance programs were implemented, however, they
4° 1 15 U.S.C. § 1674 (2000); see, e.g., Susan D. KOVI1C, judgment-Proof Debtors in Bank-
ruptcy, 65 Ant. IIANKR. 675, 720 n. 186 (1991) ("Was'the debtor fired because his or her
wages were garnished or because the debtor missed work to go to court or because worry
about his or her financial situation affected the job performance?").
4" See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
4" See Burdens, supra note 15, at 62. Legal scholars have cited this criticism of public
assistance programs to criticize the disposable income test of Chapter 13. See, e.g., LoPucki,
supra note 23, at 471 ("Today, even the crudest welfare proposal must leave the welfare
recipient with some incentive to earn the marginal dollar or the proposal has no hope of
adoption. It is generally acknowledged that if alimony and child support levels are set too
high, they can be counterproductive by discouraging the payor from earning more money.
let under the scheme of Chapter 13, the debtor who earns an additional dollar is required
to pay that additional dollar to unsecured creditors.").
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found that recipients did retain some of the additional income they
earned because welfare caseworkers were liberal in allowing the re-
cipients to deduct certain expenses. 4" The same is likely to be true in
bankruptcy; there is at least anecdotal evidence that debtors retain a
large portion of the benefit of an improvement in their circumstances
when their plans are modified to increase the required repayments. 405
Still, the marginal tax rate created by a disposable income clause
is likely to be extremely high. But, as a matter of theory, one cannot
conclude that a collection system with a high marginal tax rate dis-
courages work more than one with a low marginal rate. Consider a
public assistance program again. If recipients are allowed to retain
more of their income, the current recipients may very well work
more. This change, however, would also make public assistance attrac-
tive to more individuals, and these new recipients would work less
than they did before. Because benefits are still partially reduced as
earnings increase, these individuals retain less of their marginal dollar
earned and thus have less incentive to work. In addition, the public
assistance gives them additional wealth, further reducing their need
for income and their incentive to sacrifice leisure. To determine
whether the lower rate resulted in more hours worked one must
compare the additional hours worked by the original recipients and
the reduced hours worked by the new recipients:"
This same logic would apply in bankruptcy. A system that allows
bankrupt debtors to retain more of their disposable income may en-
courage bankrupt debtors to work more. This change may, however,
also make bankruptcy attractive to more debtors and thereby encour-
age others to file. Because bankruptcy would seize some of the dispos-
able income of these new bankrupt debtors, they would keep less of
their marginal earnings than they did before. In addition, bankruptcy
increases their wealth and thus reduces their incentive to work.
Therefore, the correct method of taxing a bankrupt debtor's in-
come depends critically on empirical assumptions. This is not a deci-
sion, however, that courts are asked to make in the context of imple-
404 See Burtless, supra note 15, at 63.
4°5 See supra notes 366-369 and accompanying text. Perhaps more significantly, the
three-year limitation on the disposable income test places a limit on the effective marginal
rate. When debtors works to increase their wages or earn a promotion, their economic
income includes not only their current pay but also the increase in their future earnings as
well. Because a disposable income clause does not seize the increased future earnings after
the termination of the plan, it does not create an effective marginal rate of 100% and
debtors retain some incentive to work. See supra notes 366-369 and accompanying text.
406 See Burtless, supra note 15, at 69.
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menting Chapter 13. The language of the Bankruptcy Code makes it
clear that. Chapter 13 should only be open to those debtors with
sufficient regular income to make the payments required by a plan
filed tinder that chapter. Today, the language of the Code requires
that these payments be set with regard to the debtor's pmjected or ex-
pected income. Therefore, those whose income is highly uncertain
are unlikely to earn enough to be able to repay an amount. based on
their projected income. Dismissing these cases may not lead to the
optimal result, but it will not lead to a result that would justify a de-
parture front the plain meaning of the statute.
CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy resembles a public insurance program in that. it pro-
vides assistance—in the form of debt. relief—to individuals who have
suffered some misfortune. 407
 Bankruptcy resembles a tax in that it.
frequently compels individuals to make payments out of their future
income. Like public insurance or progressive taxation, bankruptcy
creates moral hazards. Because bankruptcy makes financial distress
less painfid, it creates a grasshopper problem by encouraging debtors
to engage in behavior, such as excessive spending, that makes distress
more likely:ma Bankruptcy also creates an opossum problem by en-
couraging debtors to claim more relief than their actual circum-
stances require. 409
 With enough information, a judge can solve both
the opossum and grasshopper problems and implement a utopian
bankruptcy system that, like the first-best public insurance and tax
systems, results in zero loss of efficiency. To do this, the judge would
reduce the debts of deserving debtors to an amount, commensurate
with each debtor's ability to repay.
While such a utopian bankruptcy system provides a useful
benchmark, it is a poor model for public policy because it requires
omniscient. judges who can precisely determine which debtors are de-
serving of relief and how much they can earn to repay their debts. 41 °
Of more relevance is the second-best, or feasible, bankruptcy system,
which accounts for the limited information real judges possess and
the inevitable moral hazards that result. from these limitations. 4" In
407 See, e.g., SULLIVAN Er AL., supra note 4, at 5.
108 See supra notes 26, 122 and accompanying text.
109 See SUM Part II.A.2.
410 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
411 See sugar Part MB,
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the absence of explicit code provisions designed to solve these moral
hazard problems, judges have seized on the discretion granted them
explicitly or implicitly by the Bankruptcy Code to implement impor-
tant elements of this second-best bankruptcy system. 412 The judicial
approaches to the moral hazard problems resemble the approaches
taken in actual public insurance and taxation systems.
While the utopian bankruptcy system would instruct judges to
solve the grasshopper problem by denying relief to the negligent,
judges have not tried to do so:" This approach mirrors that taken by
both private insurance contracts and public insurance programs that
operate in an imperfect, or second-best, world:" Insurance generally
protects individuals against the consequences of their own negligence
because judges cannot always distinguish between the negligent and
the prudent—and individuals may not be able to conform to the
judges' expectations even if the judges could make this distinction:"
Neither public insurance programs nor private insurance con-
tracts, however, provide relief for willful misconduct, whereas bank-
ruptcy does. Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code contains a superdis-
charge that will even relieve the debtor of a judgment for a willful and
malicious tort.'" Judicial resistence to the superdischarge is predict-
able because, in affording relief to the willful and malicious, bank-
ruptcy departed from the approach taken in other public insurance
programs. 417 Invoking the good faith standard of § 1325(a) (3), judges
have limited the superdischarge to those debtors who have received
sufficient punishment (satisfying deterrence concerns) and have
made a significant effort to repay their victims.'" In this way, judges
have pushed bankruptcy law toward the approach that public insur-
ance programs take toward the grasshopper problem. 419
To solve the opossum problem, the utopian bankruptcy system
would instruct the judge to reduce a debtor's obligations to an
amount commensurate with the debtor's ability to repay. Chapter 13
appears to embrace this approach by reducing a debtor's obligations
to an amount commensurate with the debtor's projected income. 420
412 See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
413 See supra notes 227-231 and accompanying text.
414 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
418 See Schwartz, supra note 124, at 325.
416 1 1	 § 1328 (2000).
417 Sec supra notes 142-148 and accompanying text.
418 Sec supra Part 11113.21
416 Sec supra Part 11113.2.
420 Id. § 1325(b).
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Judges resist this approach, however, because they are skeptical of
their own ability to project income and thus fear that a debtor will
"play `possum" and understate future income. This skepticism causes
some judges to adopt a strained reading of the Bankruptcy Code to
adopt a second-best approach, a system that creates an effective tax on
the debtor's actual income in bankruptcy. This approach mirrors the
structure of actual taxation and public assistance programs. In gen-
eral, citizens are taxed not on what they can earn but what they actu-
ally earn. Likewise, public assistance programs frequently reduce the
benefits paid as the recipient's actual income increases, but make no
attempt to measure a recipient's actual abilities.
In the bankruptcy context, however, judges may be able to ac-
count for their limited information in ways that do less violence to the
plain meaning of the Bankruptcy Code. If judges can use the debtor's
income history to provide at least a workable projection of the
debtor's future income, they can base the debtor's required payments
on this projection, not on actual income. This approach would be
much closer to the ideal solution to the opossum problem and it
should be favored, provided that the debtor's income history allows
the judge to make a fairly accurate projection.
In the unique context of Chapter 13, which should apply only to
debtors with regular income, 421
 the debtor's past income may provide
the judge with sufficient information to project future income. If the
judge does not have sufficient information—i.e. if the debtor does not
have predictable income—the statutory structure suggests that the
judge respond by holding Chapter 13 relief to be unavailable rather
than by imposing a tax on actual income within bankruptcy: 122
If debtors denied relief in Chapter 13 rely on state law for protec-
tion, then they will in fact. receive a tax on their actual income in the
form of a state garnishment proceeding; this is the appropriate collec-
tion mechanism for an individual with irregular income. A debtor also
has a right, however, to file under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.
This chapter ignores debtors' future income—probably their most
valuable asset—when setting their required repayment. This Article
suggests that, despite this anomaly, Chapter 7 may still play a role in
an optimal bankruptcy system if restricted to those debtors who would
repay nothing in Chapter 13.
121 Id . § 109( e ) .
422 Sec id.
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Whether current bankruptcy law contains adequate mechanisms
for limiting Chapter 7 to these debtors is questionable, 423 though this
is a topic for another clay. Nevertheless, the analogy between bank-
ruptcy and public insurance is likely to yield valuable insights. 424 The
search for the proper tools to deal with the problems of poverty and
inequality has represented one of the most vibrant areas of economic
research for over one hundred years. Although economists have long
agreed on a fairly simple first-best approach, they continue to vigor-
ously debate the precise form of the second-best, or feasible, program.
Therefore, if we are interested in a feasible optimal bankruptcy sys-
tem, the public assistance and taxation literatures do not promise an
easy answer. They do offer, however, valuable lessons and remind us
that whatever system we do choose must be designed to operate in a
non-optimal world.
42  See SULLIVAN ET AL., Sli•/ note 4, at 13.
4=4 Scholars have already noted the analogy between means-testing in public assistance
programs and proposals for means-testing in bankruptcy. See, e.g., Dickerson, supra note 16,
at 52-56. Economists, however, suggest other mechanisms for distinguishing those who are
truly in need from those who can in fact support themselves such as the use of punishment
or in-kind transfers. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
